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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) of 1996' was in debate, both supporters and opponents
focused on what changes it would make in formal eligibility rules for
means-tested programs. The legislation's champions emphasized its new
work requirements that were widely popular with the general public, but
generally avoided talking about reductions in benefits. The message they
sought to convey was that assistance would remain available to those who
demonstrated their willingness to try to help themselves through work.
2
Opponents, in turn, tried to portray the legislation as hardhearted and
predicted that states would impose eligibility rules denying assistance to
numerous innocent families. 3 True, the legislation itself contained few
explicit restrictions on eligibility for cash assistance that were vulnerable to
political attack. Its opponents, however, forecast a "race to the bottom" in
which states would restrict eligibility rules to avoid attracting migrants from
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections
of 7 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Typical were the comments of Republican Senator Rick Santorum, who promised that
recipients would receive "education and training that is meaningful" and promised that "if you
cannot find a job in the private sector, if you cannot get a job on your own, the State will assist
you getting that job. If you cannot find a private-sector job, the State will assist you in getting a
public-sector job." 142 CONG. REC. 18,486 (1996) (statement of Sen. Santorum). He went on to
assure the public that low-income families could count on a "[flederal safety net system that is
there to provide for every aspect.., of the 50 or more programs that there are to take care of
every possible need a child in America has." Id. In a similar vein, House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Bill Archer described the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)
block grant as simply being a more "efficient" way to aid low-income families. 141 CONG.
REC. 8491 (1995) (statement of Rep. Archer).
3. See, e.g., Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective,
109 HARV. L. REv. 1984 (1996). According to former Clinton Administration subcabinet officer
and distinguished legal scholar Peter Edelman,
[A]ny decent nation has to provide a safety net of assistance for its children. Flawed as
it was, the previous system had that safety net. Benefits varied widely, but everywhere
in America a family coming to a welfare office could get help if they met the federal
requirements. This had been true for sixty years. Now no state had any federally
defined obligation to help needy children.
PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA'S HEART 140 (2001). Similarly, social historian
Charles Noble wrote of PRWORA:
The changes were historic. AFDC was converted to a block grant, ending its
entitlement status. A tough work requirement was imposed: the law required states to
place at least 25% of cash welfare recipients into jobs or work programs by 1997, and
50% by 2002. Adults who failed to find work within two years were to be denied all
federal funds. No one could receive federal cash assistance for more than five years.
States could deny welfare benefits to women who had additional children while on
welfare, and to unmarried persons under eighteen. Federal funds were denied to
unmarried parents under eighteen who did not live with an adult and attend school.
Legal immigrants' access to any form of public assistance was radically limited. In one
fell swoop, the nation had given up its commitment to income maintenance as a "right."
CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 128 (1997).
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less generous neighbors.4 The change from a program with federal
matching funds to a fixed block grant would increase states' financial
incentives to restrict eligibility for means-tested programs.
Both PRWORA's supporters and its opponents focused single-
mindedly on formal eligibility rules. Yet formal, explicitly substantive rules
are only one way in which the government rations public benefits. Systems
that lead to procedural denials of substantively eligible claimants, that
discourage claimants from seeking or continuing to receive benefits, or that
give third parties influence over whether a claimant will receive benefits
also have a rationing effect. The importance of such informal rationing
systems had been growing for some time, but the 1996 welfare law moved
them to the center of public welfare policy. Personal choice-and its
manipulation-have replaced formal rules as the dominant theme in public
benefits law.
The widespread embrace of the personal choice model represents a sea
change in American public benefits law. Under this model, states have
sought to restructure both their formal and informal rationing systems so
that a claimant's failure to receive benefits can be attributed to the
claimant's own choices rather than to those of the state. Instead of explicitly
declaring a claimant ineligible for benefits, the state agency may act more
subtly to influence the process through which claimants make choices.
Alternatively, it may establish rules that interpret claimants' ambiguous
actions as choices. Such attempts to influence claimants' choices may result
from deliberate state policy decisions, but they also may result from the
independent actions of local administrators and eligibility workers
responding to perceived signals or incentives to reduce caseloads.
This personal choice model of public benefits law differs fundamentally
from any that came before it. Appreciating the importance of this new
model for rationing public benefits requires some historical perspective.
Public benefit programs for low-income people in this country have gone
through four major periods. During the first and by far the longest period,
these programs were almost exclusively local creations. This period began
in the early days of the Republic and lasted until the Great Depression. 5
4. See EDELMAN, supra note 3, at 146; Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism:
Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2078 (1996) (noting
critics' fear that states would engage in a "race to the bottom").
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 3-109 (1986) (describing variations in local practice, as well as essential
continuities, over the course of this period); FRANCES Fox P1VEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 23-38 (Vintage Books 2d ed.
1993) (1971) (interpreting the policies of this period, both here and abroad, as efforts to discipline
the work force); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 237-64 (1971) (placing the "poor house era" in the context of a
larger preoccupation with institutions as remedies, first therapeutic and then custodial, to myriad
social problems); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF
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Although commonly referred to as the "poorhouse era, ' 6 the cost and
administrative demands of maintaining institutions for all people in need of
public aid quickly proved insuperable. Thus, the vast majority of families
receiving aid were not sent to the poorhouse.7 In theory, however, aid
provided in the community ("outdoor relief") was seen as an alternative to
institutionalization. 8 The poorhouse remained a potent symbol of the moral
opprobrium associated with receipt of public aid and a deterrent to those
who might consider seeking public assistance. 9 In this period, local officials
had virtually unlimited discretion about what, if anything, to do for (or
about) destitute families. The guiding philosophy of the era was that
poverty was a manifestation of immorality.
The poorhouse had fallen into general disuse by the Civil War, but the
highly localized and nonprofessional character of the system continued
until local governments' financial ability to relieve the poor collapsed
during the Great Depression.' ° Responding to this collapse, and to advocacy
by social workers, President Roosevelt and Congress federalized a
significant part of the financing of poor relief." This new system preserved
a great deal of local discretion, but administration of programs soon passed
from general government officials (such as township trustees) to
professional social workers. These social workers sought to remedy the
poverty of low-income families the way they might try to remedy
alcoholism or other antisocial behavior. Nonetheless, the moral
condemnation of low-income people became less universal; for example, in
Edwards v. California, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that
immorality and poverty could be equated. 12 The guiding principle of this
era was the exercise of social workers' professional judgment.
The turmoil of the 1960s, and changes within the social work
profession, made this model unsustainable.1 3 The welfare rolls exploded in
response to migration from the rural South to northern and western cities,
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 47-272 (6th ed. 1994) (describing the role of social workers and
other professionals in spurring this country to move beyond institutionalization). To be sure, this
country's treatment of low-income persons varied and evolved enormously over this period. In
particular, belief in the promise of institutional responses to poverty blossomed during the
Jacksonian era but largely faded within a few years. Shifting attitudes toward urbanization and
immigration over this period also affected the treatment of low-income people. Nonetheless,
enough features remained constant-devolution of broad, subjective discretion to local officials
and the treatment of poverty as a symptom of moral failure-to justify treating this span of years
as a single period for purposes of comparison with the current regime.
6. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 5, at 3-109 (contrasting the theory and practice of the
poorhouse era across more than a century).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 54-55.
9. Id. at 33-34.
10. See id. at 219-22; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 5, at 57-61.
11. See KATZ, supra note 5, at 217-39; TRATTNER, supra note 5, at 275-99.
12. 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
13. See TRATTNER, supra note 5, at 337-46.
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the banning of overt racial discrimination, and welfare rights advocacy.' 4
States and localities struggling under the costs of this expansion decided
that they could not afford to continue to hire enough licensed social workers
to give them the small caseloads required for them to practice their
profession. A few years later, a new legalistic model arose, spurred by two
factors: first, President Johnson's funding of legal services, programs as part
of the War on Poverty; and second, the Supreme Court's recognition of
statutory and procedural due process claims asserted by claimants- for public
benefits in King v. Smith15 and Goldberg v. Kelly, 16 respectively. Social
workers were largely removed from programs' administration,
policymaking was further centralized, and in place of professional judgment
came a complex set of statutory and regulatory rules that at least purported
to be objective. The dominant figure in this era, replacing the township
trustee and the social worker, was the lawyer. The guiding principle of this
era was constraining discretion through uniform rules. In place of the
poorhouse or the social worker's clipboard, the physical symbol of the era
might be a volume of the Federal Supplement or perhaps of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
The legalistic era of public benefit programs ended with the restrictions
on federally financed legal services Congress enacted in 199517 and the
elimination of the legal entitlement to cash assistance the following year in
PRWORA. As in the earlier transitions, however, the collapse or
debilitation of the old regime became apparent well before it was clear what
new system would take its place. This Article describes and analyzes the
evolving principles of this new order of public benefit programs. It finds
that while some of the trappings of the old regime linger-notably formal
eligibility rules-the new regime has increasingly marginalized them in
favor of a heavy practical and rhetorical emphasis on claimants' choices.
The primary focus of public policy increasingly is to manipulate those
choices. Rather than be guided by the actions of lawyers (or the social
workers or township trustees of eras past), the professionals we now
venerate are economists, even if relatively few of them may actually be
involved in program management. Persons wishing to affect policy thus
must adopt the analytic methods and tools of economists, modifying rules
to adjust claimants' incentives rather than to reach a particular outcome
directly. This Article concludes that while greater reliance on claimants'
14. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 5, at 183-98; see also LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE
NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 28 (1992).
15. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
17. The final restrictions are found in 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b). Continuing appropriations acts
had begun to impose these restrictions in October 1995. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 30, 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-31, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 278, 279 (requiring the Legal Services Corporation to follow
restrictions in the then-pending bill until final legislation could be authorized).
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genuine choices can both improve the distribution of benefits and leave
claimants with more autonomy, such choice-based rationing systems raise
serious concerns of equity, efficiency, and democratic legitimacy.
The stakes involved are substantial. In each of the two years following
the start of the most recent recession in March 2001, states' assistance
caseloads under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
block grant declined about 2% from their already historically low levels.' 8
By contrast, in the first two years after the previous recession began in July
1990, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) caseloads rose
11% and 7%.19 Over the two years following March 2001, the number of
people participating in the food stamp program, which has been
restructured much less than cash assistance programs, increased 11% and
9%.20 As far as those relying upon media accounts are likely to be aware,
however, cash assistance programs' eligibility rules still offer aid to those in
need.21 It is of course possible that these changes can be accounted for by
families that are making free and voluntary choices not to receive aid for
which they are eligible. Nonetheless, it seems important to investigate the
possibility that some other, hidden process is working to deny aid to
increasing numbers of families at the very time when the economic
downturn is making employment less available.22 The consequences
18. ELISE RICHER ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, WELFARE CASELOADS IN 27
STATES DECLINE IN FIRST QUARTER OF 2003, at 1-2 (2003), http://www.clasp.org/DMS/
Documents/1058538793.25/caseload_2003_Q 1.pdf.
19. These figures are derived from the author's tabulations of data from the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). See Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Flash Data Reports
(June 2003) (on file with author). The AFDC caseload was 4,037,976 in July 1990; 4,499,870 in
July 1991; and 4,815,463 in July 1992. By contrast, 2,114,414 families were receiving assistance
at the beginning of the current recession. Id. Thus, even with a much higher number of families
already receiving aid, AFDC responded to a substantial increase in need while TANF actually
reduced the number of families it helped as need rose.
20. I have tabulated these figures based on data available online. See Food & Nutrition
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food Stamp Program Monthly Data (Nov. 25, 2003), at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/fsmonthly.htm. The number of food stamp recipients was 17,249,899
in March 2001; 19,216,647 in March 2002; and 21,019,190 in March 2003. Id. The food stamp
increases in the first two years following July 1990 were 14% percent and 11% percent. See Food
& Nutrition Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Key Data Reports (June 2003) (on file with author).
21. But see SHARON PARROTT & NINA WU, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES
ARE CUTTING TANF AND CHILD CARE PROGRAMS 1 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/6-3-03tanfpdf
(finding that many states have in fact reduced these programs in response to the recession). These
cuts, however, can hardly explain shrinking cash assistance caseloads. This is particularly true
since most of the cuts have affected childcare subsidies, which generally are not included in
caseload figures, and since caseload declines are by no means confined to the states that have
narrowed eligibility.
22. There is some indication that recessions hit those with the least skills disproportionately
hard, as workers displaced from higher-paying jobs are able to displace them from the low-skilled
employment market. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 25-26, 34-38,(1996). Conversely, a significant part of the
reason that low-skilled welfare recipients were able to find jobs in the mid- and late 1990s was
that ultralow unemployment rates made employers despair of finding any more skilled applicants
for their low-paying positions. HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., EMPLOYERS IN THE BOOM: HOW DID
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of extreme poverty for the health, 23 education,24 social adjustment,25 and
long-term well-being 26 of the children in these families are too great for an
anomaly of this kind to be ignored.
This Article examines the implications of the pervasive emphasis on
incentives and choices in public benefits law: the creation of a new system
of informal rationing that has eclipsed the importance of formal eligibility
rules, sharp changes in those formal eligibility rules themselves that
transcend traditional ideological labels, and a fundamental change in the
nature of advocacy over public benefits issues. Many of the principles
considered here apply across a wide range of programs. The Article's
primary focus, however, is on means-tested programs providing subsistence
benefits to low-income families-particularly cash assistance and, to a
much lesser extent, food stamps, Medicaid, and childcare subsidies. Part II
explores the basic choices involved in rationing public benefits, contrasting
formal and informal systems. It then addresses the factors that are likely to
go into a potential claimant's decision on whether to apply for, or to
continue to receive, a public benefit. It finds that a combination of
ideological, political, and practical considerations have increasingly driven
policymakers to rely upon informal rationing systems that seek to present
individuals' failure to receive benefits as the result of their own choices
rather than of the state's policy decisions.
Part III analyzes the ways in which the increasing emphasis on
claimants' choices has reshaped substantive eligibility rules, sometimes
resolving longstanding problems in programs' structures and sometimes
creating new problems. Designing rules for economic beings expected to
make rational choices is a very different task from selecting which
supposedly passive individuals should receive aid.
Part IV argues that the modes of advocacy traditionally applied
to eligibility-based rationing systems are unlikely to prove effective in
THE HIRING OF UNSKILLED WORKERS CHANGE DURING THE 1990s?, at 4-5, 18-19 (2003),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410780_BoomPaper.pdf. With unemployment rates now
hovering around six percent, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor, The Employment Situation: October 2003, at 1 (Nov. 7, 2003), it seems likely to be quite
some time before those conditions return.
23. See Sanders Korenman & Jane E. Miller, Effects of Long-Term Poverty on Physical
Health of Children in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, in CONSEQUENCES OF
GROWING UP POOR 70, 92-98 (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997).
24. See Judith R. Smith et al., Consequences of Living in Poverty for Young Children's
Cognitive and Verbal Ability and Early School Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP
POOR, supra note 23, at 132, 146-56, 164-66.
25. See Rand D. Conger et al., Family Economic Hardship and Adolescent Adjustment:
Mediating and Moderating Processes, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 23,
at 288, 305-10.
26. See Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Income Effects Across the Life Span:
Integration and Interpretation, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR, supra note 23, at 596,
596-610.
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choice-based systems. It suggests that only by changing program
administrators' incentives can advocates hope to change the incentives that
those administrators in turn create for claimants. Finally, Part V offers some
concluding observations about the ways in which analysis of public benefits
law should integrate analysis of formal and informal rationing systems.
II. TRANSFORMING THE RATIONING OF PUBLIC BENEFITS
This Part describes and analyzes the rationing of public benefits
through influencing and imputing claimants' choices, and contrasts this
approach to its predecessor. From the mid-i 960s to the mid-i 990s, public
benefits law meant a system of highly formalized eligibility rules.
Programs' strengths and weaknesses could be gleaned from a careful study
of statutes and regulations. The 1996 welfare law changed this dramatically.
It swept away the longstanding system of federal rules, but it did not require
states to replace that system with a similarly formal one of their own.
States, to be sure, did make their own rules, but these often contained only a
fraction of the policy that was applied to claimants and, even in those areas
they did cover, were typically far less outcome-determinative than the
federal and federally directed state rules that had preceded them. The
importance of this change has largely been lost amid talk of work
requirements and time limits.
This Part charts the transformation of the very nature of public benefits
law. Section A examines the evidence that a new form of rationing has
superseded that of formal eligibility rules. Section B explores the
implications of trying to ration benefits by influencing eligible claimants'
decisions to apply. Section C analyzes how the various forms of rationing
systems-formal, informal, and hybrids of the two-resemble and differ
from one another in their operation. Section D identifies the political issues
peculiar to informal rationing systems. And Section E considers under what
circumstances informal rationing may be inefficient or inequitable.
A. The Declining Importance of Formal Eligibility Rules
The national AFDC caseload peaked in March 1994 at a little over five
million families.27 Cash assistance caseloads then began a steep decline that
has continued to this day.28 The replacement of AFDC with the TANF
block grant in 1996 accelerated the decline, and the recession of 2001
slowed it, but the shrinkage has continued essentially uninterrupted for nine
full years. By March 2003, only two million families were receiving cash
27. See Dep't of Health & Human Servs., supra note 19.
28. See id.; see also RICHER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
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assistance-an unprecedented decline of more than sixty percent from 1994
levels. 29 Moreover, about a third of the remaining cases contain only
children,3° who may have few alternatives to receiving public assistance:
Among families with an adult member, then, the decline in cash assistance
receipt has been even more dramatic.
At least until the last year, very little of this decline reflected tightened
eligibility rules; the predicted "race to the bottom" among states' formal
eligibility rules 31 did not occur. Some of the decline in caseload was the
predictable result of a strong economy. A great deal of the decline,
however, reflects a rapid drop, from eighty-five percent to about half, in the
share of eligible families that actually receive cash assistance.32 That
eligible families continue to leave the cash assistance rolls even with
dubious employment opportunities in a slack economy 33 suggests that some
powerful new dynamic is at play. These declining caseloads have been so
enthusiastically received that relatively little research has been done to
understand why they are taking place. New studies, however, confirm that
at least forty percent of eligible nonparticipants are staying away because of
repellent characteristics of the program.34 Some of these results stem from
deliberate policy choices; others may have developed incidentally, although
few officials are likely to want to remedy them in a political environment
that measures success by caseload decline. The following Sections analyze
informal rationing-the deterrence of eligible claimants-as a policy
alternative to stricter eligibility rules.
29. See RICHER ET AL., supra note 18, at 4 (providing data to support these figures).
30. Office of Planning, Research & Evaluation, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Table 1-3:
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families-Active Cases: Percent Distribution of TANF Families
by Number of Adult Recipients, October 1999-September 2000, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/opre/characteristics/fy2000/103.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2003).
31. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
32. See SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, LEFT BEHIND OR STAYING AWAY? ELIGIBLE PARENTS WHO
REMAIN OFF TANF 1 (Urban Inst., Assessing the New Federalism Series No. B-51, 2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310571 _B51 .pdf.
33. In 1999, the last robust year of the 1990s expansion, about half of all families leaving
welfare were employed. See PAMELA LOPREST, FEWER WELFARE LEAVERS EMPLOYED IN WEAK
ECONOMY 2 fig.l (Urban Inst., Snapshots of Am.'s Families Series No. 5, 2003),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310837_snapshots3 no5.pdf. By 2002, that share was down
to forty-two percent. See id.
34. See SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., FAMILIES COPING WITHOUT EARNINGS OR
GOVERNMENT CASH ASSISTANCE 8-12 (Urban Inst., Assessing the New Federalism Series
Occasional Paper No. 64, 2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410634_OP64.pdf. Indeed,
another twenty-three percent of eligible nonparticipants cited pride as their prime reason for
staying away. See id. at 12-13. The sense that receiving cash assistance when in dire
circumstances is degrading certainly can be exacerbated or minimized by the way the program is
operated.
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B. An Overview of the Managed Choice Alternative to Formal
Eligibility Rules
Advocates for low-income people long have complained about
malfunctioning bureaucracies and the "barriers" they place in the paths of
eligible claimants seeking benefits for which they qualify. Described
merely as the result of ineptitude or indifference, these procedural
limitations, on claimants' access to benefits seemed to call for, and in fact
received, little rigorous analysis. Programs' eligibility determination
procedures, however, are an important part of their systems for rationing
benefits. At the simplest level, the stringency with which the government
tests applications for benefits reflects the relative degree of society's
concern about avoiding payments to ineligibles, as compared with its desire
to provide benefits to those in need. Over the last decade, however,
informal rationing through eligibility determination procedures has taken on
a far greater role in state-administered public benefit programs.
This Section provides a more rigorous examination of these rationing
methods. Subsection 1 provides a simple model to show the potential
advantages of choice-based rationing over the formal eligibility rules that
dominated public benefits law from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. From
there, Subsection 2 shows how the impact of informal rationing is likely to
differ across subgroups of claimants. Finally, Subsection 3 provides a
quantitative example of how seemingly modest changes in eligibility
determination procedures can drastically alter potential claimants' decisions
to apply for, or continue to receive, benefits.
1. Possible Responses to Shortcomings in Formal Eligibility Rules
Any sweeping condemnation of the concept of informal rationing of
public benefits would be misplaced. In principle, giving claimants' choices
a greater role in rationing public benefits has much to commend it. The
potential advantages of this method are evident when one considers a
hypothetical state in which four families (call them A, B, C, and D) are
living at seventy percent of the poverty line and another four families (W,
X, Y, and Z) are living at ninety percent of the poverty line. For some
combination of fiscal, political, and philosophical reasons, the state is only
willing to allocate enough resources to provide a meaningful level of
benefits to four families. The obvious response is to set the income
eligibility limit between seventy percent and ninety percent of poverty and
serve families A through D.
But suppose family A is living in a well-insulated house it owns free
and clear, in an area with low property taxes, and has a substantial
vegetable garden. Perhaps the adults in family A have standing offers of
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employment from a relative but prefer to enjoy their leisure time. Suppose
also that family W has a seriously ill child whose health requires family
members to keep their poorly insulated apartment quite warm. Family W is
paying fairly high rent and cannot afford to move to a cheaper area because
it needs to be close to the hospital where the child is being treated. The
child's extensive needs and frequent crises have caused the family largely
to exhaust its "favor bank" with friends and neighbors, forcing it to pay
every time it needs spot childcare. One can imagine that the adults in family
W may be unable to increase their hours of work because of their
responsibilities to care for their sick child, and may have few prospects for
changing to more lucrative jobs because they depend on their current
employers' flexibility in letting them miss time at short notice when the
child has a crisis. In sum, family W may be living much less well than the
nominally poorer family A and may need public aid far more.
Conventional modem eligibility-based systems of rationing offer three
possible solutions, none of them terribly appealing. First, the state can allow
for this possibility and give benefits to all eight families. To do that, it will
have to reduce the amount of those benefits to the point that they cannot
meaningfully accomplish their intended purpose.35 Resources spent on
families X, Y, and Z clearly would be better targeted on families B, C, and
D. Second, the state can attempt to write eligibility rules that capture the
differences in circumstances that make family A less needy than family W.
To do that, however, the state will have to make the program substantially
more intrusive into the personal affairs of all eight families. It will have to
expand its bureaucracy to ask these questions and to guard against families
dissembling in their answers. Even then, it might well fail to identify, or
correctly quantify, all of the significant ways in which families A and W
differ from more typical families at their respective income levels. Finally,
the state simply can continue to distribute the benefits only on the basis of
income and accept the inefficient result that family A is served instead of
the needier family W.36 The obvious inadequacies of each of these
35. Eliminating the functional sufficiency of these benefits can defeat the purpose of the
program, undermine its political support, and create economic inefficiencies. See David A. Super,
The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2004).
36. The social work model of distributing benefits that dominated AFDC into the 1960s
offered a fourth option: having a skilled professional interview all of the families and make an
expert determination about which four need benefits the most (or, perhaps, whether the needs of a
fifth or sixth family are great enough to justify providing less-than-adequate benefits to all
families). This model collapsed in the face of philosophical objections on both left and right:
Liberals decried its paternalism and potential to ration benefits according to caseworkers'
prejudices, and conservatives regarded social workers as too indulgent of low-income families.
See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1137-38 (2000). The cost of social
workers also assured this model's demise. Even if social workers still staffed local welfare offices,
in practice the professional evaluation model brings with it much of the intrusiveness and at least
as much vulnerability to manipulation and fraud as the system of fine-tuned eligibility rules in the
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 815
Offering an Invisible Hand
approaches make it quite natural to seek a better way of matching available
benefits to need.
Gauging the strength of claimants' desire for the benefit is one possible
solution. Assuming that family A is not unduly greedy and that family W is
not unusually proud or despondent, the variations in their need should
roughly correspond to variations in their desire for the benefit. If the state
could accurately measure the strength of this desire, it could correctly
decide to award the benefit to family W over family A. This is what pricing
systems do in the private market. Exploring ways to apply similar
techniques to distribute public benefits seems quite reasonable.
Finding techniques that work in public benefit programs, however, is
not easy. In an idealized world of perfect markets, in which all claimants
and potential claimants have perfect information and bear no transaction
costs to access benefits, creating a market for a public benefit would be
impossible. As long as the benefit has any value, all eight families will
prefer having it to not. The actions of those with the greatest need will be
indistinguishable from those of families with lesser need, even assuming
that need translates perfectly into desire. On the other hand, in the real
world, where markets fall well short of perfect, the state can try to test the
relative strengths of the families' desire for aid by increasing the costs of
learning about the benefit or by reducing its value." Claimants with less
desire may casually overestimate the hurdles they face and give up. These
less needy claimants may value their time and dignity more than their more
impoverished neighbors. Those neighbors' severe need, on the other hand,
may discipline them to accurately evaluate the burdens of applying.
Another strategy a state might use to distinguish among potential
claimants with varying degrees of desire for a benefit is to restrict the
availability of information about the program. The state might reason that
those with the strongest desires for the benefit will try hardest to learn of its
existence. At a minimum, a state could refrain from conducting outreach. It
might then expect the families with the greatest need to make more-and
more determined-inquiries and thus be more likely to learn of the
program's existence. It may be, however, that the less needy families would
still want help enough that they, as well as the neediest ones, would make
second alternative above. See id. at 1195-96 (criticizing the post-PRWORA TANF administration
for reviving the highly discretionary methods that existed until the 1960s in an administrative
structure that was staffed by nonprofessionals who had no professional code of conduct to guide
them).
37. As discussed below, potential claimants' different tolerances for risk and different rates
for discounting future expectations of wealth also may affect how they react to various possible
kinds of disincentives. See also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How
SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 67-69 (1997) (quoting welfare
recipients as citing the risks of a layoff and destitution while awaiting the resumption of welfare
benefits as reasons for not seeking work).
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sufficiently urgent inquiries to learn of the program. Merely keeping a low
profile, therefore, might prove an insufficient mechanism to ration the
available benefits. If so, the state could create more formidable information
barriers, perhaps by keeping many other social services agencies unaware
of the program's existence. It could write a confusing application form or
have no form at all, forcing claimants either to judge for themselves or to
make even more energetic inquiries to learn what the state requires to
determine their eligibility.38 It could even disseminate misinformation about
the program, discouraging all but the most desperate from applying.
Another strategy for inducing potential claimants to sort themselves by
degree of need or desire for the benefit would be to degrade that benefit's
value. This could be done in any one of several ways. Most obviously, the
state could reduce what it spends on the benefit, perhaps requiring
recipients to make payments of their own. By itself, this might not reveal
much about the families' relative desire since it is easy to quantify and
would affect all families equally. It might, however, magnify-the effects of
some additional, indirect methods of reducing the attractiveness of the
benefit that may be perceived differently by claimants of varying degrees
of need.
The state could reduce the value of the benefit indirectly in at least five
ways. First, it could increase -the transaction costs of applying for it or of
continuing to receive it. For example, the agency might require more visits
to its offices, keep claimants waiting longer when they do visit, or force
them to spend more time filling out forms or collecting proof of eligibility.
It could require them to document a certain number of attempts to find
employment, consuming considerable time as well as childcare and
transportation resources to obtain the necessary signatures. It could add
demanding procedural requirements that a significant percentage of
claimants would fail to meet. It could even hire incompetent eligibility
workers, or overburden competent ones, and provide incentives to deny
borderline applications. To preserve the appearance of fairness, the state
might allow families to press their claims through time-consuming-and
38. Although this possibility may seem absurd in the modem world of bureaucratic public
benefit program administration, this is essentially the way township relief and similar programs
operated for decades prior to state governments' assumption of responsibility for operating
assistance programs. Township relief and similar programs continue to operate in a number of
rural states and often are the only form of cash assistance available to childless adults. See, e.g.,
Foster v. Ctr. Township, 527 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Ind.) (interpreting rules governing the interaction
between such programs and the food stamp program), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1981)
(unpublished table decision); Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976) (same);
KATZ, supra note 5, at 283-85 (describing the demise of most general assistance programs in the
late twentieth century).
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often confusing-administrative hearings, while remaining reasonably
confident that few would do SO.
3 9
A second way in which the state could reduce the value of the benefit is
to enhance the stigma of receiving the benefit, either by making it better
known who gets it or by inducing public hostility toward those who do.
Even if privacy laws prevent the agency from publishing the names of
claimants, its eligibility determination process could require them to bring
notes from people likely to be important to them. To the same end, the state
could require recipients to show some garish, readily recognizable card to
access the benefit. Alternatively, it could publicize incidents of fraud and
post signs widely encouraging the public to be on the lookout for fraudulent
recipients. It could even try to accomplish both purposes at once by sending
fraud investigators out to contact applicants' neighbors, landlords, or
children's schools. Most simply, eligibility workers could display their
scorn each time the family applied or was authorized to receive benefits.
The most desperate families might feel they had to endure this stigma to
avoid total destitution, but any families that could flee the program
likely would.
A third indirect method of making the benefit less attractive without
affecting its nominal value is to constrain its use. At a minimum, this would
mean providing the benefit in kind rather than as cash. The state could go
further. If it were a medical benefit, the state also could limit beneficiaries
to inept doctors or heartless managed care plans. If the benefit were a
housing subsidy, the state could require recipients to live in undesirable
areas with poor housing stocks, limited transportation, bad schools, and few
jobs. If it were food assistance, the state could allow recipients to obtain
only certain foods, perhaps ones that are unlikely to appeal to children or to
some ethnic groups. Less desperate families might value the benefit less if
they had different priorities for additional consumption or if they thought
they could afford more desirable goods or services. The neediest families
probably could not have afforded much better anyway and might acquiesce
in the inferior benefits.
A fourth way to reduce the benefit's value indirectly is an eligibility
procedure that induces claimants to make errors resulting in denial or
39. An extreme case of an eligibility determination process increasing a claimant's costs, and
thus reducing the net value of the benefit, is the major refundable tax credits: the earned income
tax credit and the new broadly refundable child credit in the 2001 tax reduction law. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 32 (2000); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 201(c)(1), 115 Stat. 38, 45-47 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 24(d)(1)). Both have extremely complex
eligibility rules, requiring claimants to provide extensive information to the Internal Revenue
Service. Neither, however, provides eligibility workers to inform potential claimants of what is
required or to help them complete the necessary forms. As a result, many low-income workers
effectively have little choice but to pay a significant portion of their benefits to tax preparation
firms, which effectively function as private eligibility workers.
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termination of their benefits. A rule conditioning benefits on a claimant's
performance of a particular action by a certain date may cause numerous
defaults if requirements or deadlines are poorly explained or if the action is
not readily within the claimant's ability to perform: Confusing forms are a
common example of such a barrier. Similarly, eligible claimants may cease
to pursue benefits if they understand the administering agency to have told
them that they do not qualify. Furthermore, cumbersome procedures may
cause the administering agency to deny or terminate benefits incorrectly.
Some procedural defaults will result in the claimant not receiving benefits
at all; others will increase the cost of participating by forcing the claimant
to repeat parts of the eligibility determination process.
A final indirect method of reducing a benefit's value is to offer rewards
to those who abstain from using the benefit or penalties for those who do
claim it. The state could allow each family to receive only a certain number
of months of the benefit in the parent's lifetime. Families whose current
need is more moderate may be more likely to "bank" months of benefits;
desperate families may not feel they can afford to do so. The state could
offer an alternative benefit-one that is easier to obtain and less
stigmatized, such as a single lump-sum payment-to those agreeing to
forego the main program. The state also could impose severe penalties for
procedural transgressions and do so in such an imprecise or careless way
that any recipient is at some risk of suffering those penalties. These
penalties could range from extended periods of disqualification from
receiving the benefit-periods when any future increase in need would be
irrelevant-to criminal prosecution for presumed fraud. The less desperate
families may feel both that they have more to lose and that they need not
take this risk; their needier neighbors again may be more inclined to take
the chance if the alternative is lacking food, shelter, or medical care for
their children or not having the childcare or transportation they require to
find a job that could provide lasting improvement in their family's financial
situation.
2. Differential Responses to Informal Rationing Systems
The more desperate families, B, C, D, and W, could be expected to
endure these burdens because they have nowhere else to turn. 40 The others
may drop away as they perceive the transaction costs to approach or equal
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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the value of the benefit.4' This is possible because the marginal utility
produced by each additional dollar of income (or benefits whose value can
be translated into income) declines as income rises. If the benefit is food
assistance, it may mean the difference between a monotonous diet and a
more balanced one for the less desperate families but may be crucial to
helping their more desperate neighbors have enough food to eat through the
month. If the benefit is housing assistance, it may allow one group of
families to move out of dilapidated or overcrowded conditions while
offering the other the means to avoid homelessness.
Families dropping away because state policies have reduced the value
of the benefit can do so in one of four ways. Some will hear of the onerous
eligibility determination process and not apply. Others will begin the
process but then withdraw their applications when they realize what is
required of them. Still others will intentionally or unintentionally fail to
fulfill one of the procedural requirements and be denied on that basis.
Finally, some will begin to receive benefits but will default on a procedural
requirement of continued participation.
Which of these four patterns of disenrollment occurs is likely to depend
upon which methods of discouraging participation an agency employs.
Administrative hurdles that are announced at the time of application---or
that are contained in the application form itself-may reduce the rate at
which potential claimants apply. Particularly heavy burdens for those
seeking to qualify initially may cause many claimants to withdraw their
applications or to default on procedural requirements. These burdens are
likely to disproportionately affect those with short-term needs for benefits
as well as those with relatively modest needs; they may have less effect on
those who expect their need to be chronic.42 On the other hand, procedures
that burden recipients by requiring frequent reports or reapplications may
particularly discourage those with modest but chronic need, including those
hoping to combine low-wage work with public benefit receipt.
Procedures that raise the cost of establishing or reestablishing eligibility
also discriminate against persons for whom the activities required to
participate are particularly costly or whose circumstances the eligibility
determination system is most likely to misjudge. Thus, if the state agency
requires claimants to produce ten pieces of paper, an urban claimant living
within easy walking distance of the office and the places where that
verification may be obtained may elect to participate even if his need is
41. At some point, the members of family A may decide that claiming the benefit is an option
inferior to accepting their relative's job. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that they will
take the job offer: They may still prefer leisure time to increased consumption.
42. Indeed, making the initial application process too difficult could discourage recipients
from leaving the program for uncertain prospects of employment: They may fear that, once off the
program, they will have difficulty returning. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 67-69.
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modest, while a claimant in more severe need who faces greater obstacles
to obtaining that verification-a handicap, a work schedule, a child whose
chronic health problems require numerous doctors' visits, or a lack of
access to transportation 3-may drop away.
3. Quantifying the Impact of Informal Rationing
Although the discussion above considers discouragements to
participation in qualitative terms, quantitative examination of some
examples shows that seemingly modest burdens can readily cumulate to
have powerful effects on low-income claimants.
A crucial point in analyzing procedural issues in public benefits law is
that each required point of contact with the state agency has two potential
adverse consequences, or costs, 44 to the claimant: the direct costs of making
the contact, which may include lost wages, transportation costs, childcare,
or money for postage or pay telephones, and the risk of a denial or
termination of benefits.45 Each of these factors can sharply alter a
claimant's analysis of the costs and benefits of applying for assistance.
When combined with stigma, invasions of privacy, and the psychic costs of
interacting with the public welfare system, these costs can cause a potential
claimant to decide rationally not to seek benefits with a large nominal value
for which she or he is substantively eligible.
Consider a simple example in which a working claimant is deciding
whether to apply for $200 per month in food stamps. Superficially, those
benefits are worth $2400 over the course of the next year. Assume that the
claimant has a 40% chance of denial upon her or his initial application, a
30% chance of denial upon any subsequent recertification that she or he is
required to undergo during the course of the year, and a 10% chance of an
adverse outcome-either termination of benefits or, much worse, an
accusation of fraud-each time she or he is required to report a change in
43. Transportation can be a problem for low-income people who lack reliable vehicles
in rural or spread-out suburban areas. See HEIDI GOLDBERG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STATE AND COUNTY SUPPORTED CAR OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS CAN HELP
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES SECURE AND KEEP JOBS 1 (2001), http://www.cbpp.org/l l-8-01wel.pdf.
Even in urban areas, low-income people who live near transit lines may find that some places they
need to visit are difficult to reach without a car. Id. at 6.
44. The risk of a denial or termination could as easily be seen as a diminution of the benefit
of the program rather than as an affirmative cost. The difference between these two
characterizations has little consequence for this analysis.
45. In practice, these costs partially converge. Unless the agency imposes a fixed period of
ineligibility, the consequence of an improper denial is that the claimant must reenter the claims
determination process, possibly without benefits, until his reapplication is approved. If the process
is slow and imposes high direct costs, the risk of erroneous denials is higher because they will
have more severe consequences.
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income to the agency.46 Assume further that the worker's wages fluctuate
enough that they vary by $25 or more from the prior month's level an
average of once every three months. For full certification or recertification
interviews, assume that the claimant must lose a full day's pay of $41.20
(eight hours times the $5.15 minimum hourly wage) and must pay $3 for
transportation but no additional childcare costs. 47 Assume that required
reports cost the equivalent of one hour's lost wages.
If the state requires claimants to apply for recertification every three
months48 and to report changes in earnings of $25 or more,49 the claimant
will have an 86.5% chance of being denied initially or terminated before the
end of the year. 50 Her or his expected reward for applying therefore will be
not $2400 but $792.38.51 In addition, she or he will face expected
46. For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the costs and consequences of a fraud
accusation are identical to being terminated from the program. In fact, they are surely more
severe.
47. This estimate of the cost of applying likely is conservative. Two USDA studies have
addressed this question, using somewhat different methodologies. A 1990 survey of 706
applicants in five counties found average out-of-pocket costs of $10.40. A successful application
required an average of 1.8 personal visits to-the food stamp office, with a mean cost of $1.75 per
round trip. More than half had to pay out of pocket for required documentation. Although the
average time spent was only 4.8 hours, it seems likely that losing this large a block of time would
force the applicant to take at least one full day off from work. See SUSAN BARTLETT ET AL., U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE FOOD STAMP APPLICATION PROCESS: OFFICE OPERATIONS AND CLIENT
EXPERIENCES 31-69 (1992), http://www.nal.usda.gov/foodstamp/FOODSTAMPREPORTS/
FSP-193.PDF. Indeed, many low-skilled jobs require employees to work for a whole shift or not
at all, making it likely that many lost two full days from work. A 1996 survey found average out-
of-pocket costs were $10.31 for new applicants and $5.84 for recipients seeking recertification.
The average time required was 4.8 hours for new applications and 2.3 hours for recertification.
This largely reflected an average of 2.3 trips to food stamp offices or other places (perhaps
sources of verification) for each new applicant and 1.4 trips for each recipient seeking to renew
his or her benefits. See MICHAEL PONZA ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CUSTOMER SERVICE IN
THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 38-47 (1999), http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/Published/
FSP/FILES/ProgramOperations/fspcust.pdf.
48. Three-month certification periods were becoming increasingly common prior to 2000,
when the USDA promulgated rules making the minimum certification period six months for most
households. Compare 7 C.F.R. § 273. 10(f)(4) (2000), with id. § 273. 10(f)(3)(i) (2003).
49. Until recently, this was the threshold for reporting changes in the food stamp program.
See id. § 273.12(a)(1)(i) (2002) (amended 2003); id. § 273.12(a)(1)(vii) (2003) (allowing states to
dispense with most change-reporting obligations for six months). States' cash assistance and
Medicaid rules typically also require reports for changes above this longstanding $25 threshold.
See id. § 435.916(b) (2002); LIZ SCHOTT ET AL., .CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
COORDINATING MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS 13 (2001).
50. The odds of remaining on the program throughout the year are the 60% chance of initial
approval multiplied by the 70% chance of surviving a recertification on each of three occasions
and the 90% chance of surviving each of the four required reports. I assume that the first change
in income sufficient to trigger the reporting requirement occurs in the third month of benefits, and
that each subsequent change in income occurs three months thereafter.
51. This is the sum of the actuarial value of each month's benefits, which is computed by
multiplying $200 by the chance the claimant will still be receiving benefits in a given month.
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participation costs of just under $100.52 The net benefit of applying
therefore would be $692.76, not even 30% of the face value of the benefits.
If the state instead reverts to the system prevalent during the 1980s, by
requiring monthly reports with annual recertification interviews, the
claimant's chances of being dropped from the program fall to about 79%.53
The gross expectation of benefits would rise to $943.43 over the course of
the year. The claimant's net advantage from applying would be $879.10.
While significantly better, that is still just 37% of the nominal value of the
program.
Adopting quarterly reporting with six-month certification periods, as
the USDA's July 14, 1999 initiative would permit, a state could improve
the likelihood that the claimant would be receiving food stamps in the final
month of the year to 34% and raise her or his expectation from applying to
$1042, about 43% of the face value of the potential benefits. 54 Adopting
twelve-month certification periods and semiannual reporting, as the
USDA's November 2000 rules allow, gives the claimant a better than 50%
chance of receiving food stamps for twelve months and a more than $1320
annual expectation from applying, about 55% of the potential benefits the
program could offer. At this point, some 93% of both the cost of
participating and the actuarial loss of benefits due to a denial is attributable
to the initial application.
If it wishes to do so, a state agency often can ameliorate direct costs by
reducing the intensity of the contact. For example, telephone contacts may
take less time than in-person visits.5 5 Substituting the submission of a paper
report for an office visit can allow functionally literate claimants to provide
the required information on their own time.56 Agencies also can reduce
direct costs by improving the efficiency and flexibility of their operations.
For example, they can reduce claimants' waiting time by offering and
keeping fixed appointments and can reduce the need for repeated trips by
52. This figure is reduced because the high likelihood that the claimant will be removed from
the program fairly early in the year reduces the number of recertifications she or he may have to
attend and the number of reports she or he may need to submit.
53. The claimant will have a 60% chance of surviving the initial application and a 90%
chance of surviving each of the ten monthly reports due before the twelfth month's benefits are
issued. Consistent with federal regulations, I assume that payments for a given month are
conditioned upon having filed a report in the previous month that describes circumstances of two
months earlier. For example, benefits in March are conditioned on providing a report in early
February that describes household circumstances in January.
54. I assume that the costs and risks associated with recertification subsume those of any
reports due in the same month.
55. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(1)-(2) (2003) (allowing food stamp offices to limit interviews to
once every twelve months and directing the substitution of a telephone contact for an in-person
interview in cases of hardship).
56. See id. § 273.12(a)(1)(vii) (allowing food stamp offices to substitute a simple written
report after six months' receipt of benefits for the interview and recertification that previously was
common).
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scheduling those appointments at a time when the eligibility worker will
have all information necessary to conduct a definitive interview.
Reducing the risk of denials, on the other hand, is more problematic.
The traditional strategy of claimants' advocates has been to correct denials
after the fact through the fair hearing process. For a variety of reasons, that
strategy has little promise.
57
An alternative strategy is to try to reduce the likelihood that contacts
with the agency will result in a denial or termination of benefits. Different
approaches are appropriate for different kinds of contacts. In general, these
can include changing agencies' or individual eligibility workers' incentives
to deny claimants, improving eligibility workers' competence and the
reliability of agencies' automated systems, simplifying requirements and
agencies' communications about those requirements, and reducing the
burden of those requirements. A common approach to verification
requirements, for example, has been to limit the number of items a claimant
must verify or to increase the range of items she or he may produce to meet
the requirement.
For the most part, measuring the factors that influence an eligible
potential claimant's decision to seek benefits is quite difficult. One partial
exception may be the value of the benefit. Cash assistance benefits continue
to lose value to inflation. Recent developments have reduced the value of
the Medicaid and food stamp benefits packages as well. The spread of
managed care unquestionably has changed the value of Medicaid for many
beneficiaries, although it is difficult to quantify that change in the
aggregate. In addition, some states have narrowed the Medicaid benefit
package to meet budgetary constraints.58 Fiscal concerns also have kept
57. First, fair hearings are virtually useless where a claimant was denied in technical
compliance with the agency's own rules. For example, if a broken-down city bus prevents the
claimant from arriving at an interview and the program's rules make no provision for
rescheduling, a fair hearing officer is not expected to reopen the claimant's application. If the
claimant misunderstood the eligibility worker or an agency form and missed a deadline, the
hearing officer is unlikely to reverse the termination of benefits. Occasionally a hearing officer
may feel empowered to give the claimant a second chance to comply with a procedural rule or an
eligibility worker may default, allowing the claimant's appeal to be upheld. Given the low
likelihood of such an outcome, however, the expected benefits of a fair hearing may be more than
offset by the claimant's costs of attending the hearing.
Second, only a tiny number of claimants request such hearings. See infra text accompanying
note 168. And third, the overwhelming majority of all requests for relief through hearings are
denied in their entirety. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. Given the complexity of
benefit programs' rules, the share of unrepresented claimants losing their appeals is undoubtedly
much higher. With funding reductions and substantive prohibitions reducing the availability of
legal services advocates for public benefits claimants, a system that cannot work well for
unrepresented claimants is of dubious value.
58. See LEIGHTON KU ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROPOSED STATE
MEDICAID CUTS WOULD JEOPARDIZE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ONE MILLION
PEOPLE 4-9 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/12-23-02health.pdf; VERNON SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH: A 50-STATE UPDATE FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2003, at 9 (2003), http://www.kff.org/content/2003/4082/4082.pdf.
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Medicaid's provider reimbursement rates low in many states, which may
reduce the number of providers, particularly high-quality providers, willing
to treat patients with Medicaid coverage.
Similarly, the value of food stamp benefits was reduced substantially by
PRWORA's across-the-board cuts: Reductionsin food stamp benefit levels
accounted for about 60% of PRWORA's food stamp savings, which in turn
accounted for about half of PRWORA's estimated total savings. Some
$5.4 billion, almost one-fifth of the law's estimated food stamp savings,
came from low-income working households. 59 Taking just two of the larger
cuts into account, a low-income working household that would have
received a food stamp benefit of $224 per month in 2003 under prior law is
now eligible for only $200 per month, a reduction of 11%. 6° These
reductions in benefits certainly are a factor in current recipients'
calculations of the costs and benefits of complying with reporting and
recertification requirements necessary to continue receiving benefits.
C. Formal, Informal, and Hybrid Rationing Systems
Appreciating the sensitivity of claimants' participation decisions creates
new opportunities to ration public benefits. In order to receive a public
benefit, at least three things must take place. First, the claimant must decide
to request that the benefit be provided (or continue to be provided). Second,
the administering agency must determine that the claimant has complied
with the procedural requirements for obtaining that benefit. Finally, the
state agency must determine that the individual meets the substantive
eligibility requirements for that benefit. Policymakers may change the
rationing of public benefits by influencing any of these three decisions.
Traditionally, legal and policy analysis of public benefit programs.has
focused overwhelmingly on the third of these steps-substantive eligibility
requirements. Increasingly, however, policy is being made through
manipulating the other two: dissuading potential claimants from entering or
remaining in a program or increasing the likelihood that the claimant will
be rejected for procedural reasons. These methods of rationing may go
wholly unrecognized: A program's administrators may characterize the
resulting procedural denials as the results of claimants' choices not to
comply with the program's rules. Even if they are recognized, the nature
and scope of policymaking may remain obscure; the same procedural rules
may deter some potential claimants and induce procedural defaults by
others. Thus, it often makes sense to consider together those rationing
59. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE DEPTH OF THE FOOD STAMP CUTS IN THE
FINAL WELFARE BILL 2 (1996), http://www.cbpp.org/DEPTH9.HTM.
.60. DAVID A. SUPER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WORK AND THE FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM 20 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/9-30-03fs.pdf.
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mechanisms that explicitly rely upon claimants' choices and those that
increase the rate of procedural denials.6 ' On the other hand, some policies
might help ration benefits in both formal and informal ways. A time limit is
such a hybrid: It both denies eligibility to claimants who have exhausted the
permitted number of months of benefits and discourages still-eligible
claimants from using up their remaining allocations.
Formal rationing systems that manipulate eligibility rules, informal
rationing devices: that rely on procedural rules or changing individual
choices, and hybrids of the two have many similarities. The severity of each
type of system can be adjusted to achieve the desired degree of impact
on participation, although eligibility rules may lend themselves to more
precise calibration. Each type of system is amenable to centralized or
decentralized application and to rule-based or highly discretionary
administration.62 In theory, both formal and informal systems can operate
either competitively-providing benefits to a predetermined number of
claimants based on the relative strengths of their applications or by
forgiving the least severe procedural transgressions-or as open-ended
entitlements provided to all individuals who meet some absolute standard.63
Since some eligibility rules and some eligibility determination
procedures are inevitable in any means-tested program, policymakers
generally have options to tighten or relax rationing through either approach.
Indeed, some of the most sophisticated and perceptive thinking about
informal rationing over the past decade has been done by Medicaid
administrators and advocates seeking to reduce informal impediments to
benefits. In such instances administrators have presumably doubted the
quality or voluntariness of applicants' choices not to pursue benefits.
The three respects in which formal and informal rationing systems
differ most dramatically are the manner in which they may be established,
their visibility, and whether they seek to operate absolutely or
probabilistically. Each of these differences has important consequences for
61. To be sure, unless benefits are to be forced upon persons not making application for them,
some individual choices are an inevitable part of any system for rationing public benefits. As
discussed previously in Section I.B, however, a wide range of public policies can influence those
choices.
62. For example, the state can limit participation formally with an income eligibility rule or
by empowering eligibility workers to deny benefits based on subjective criteria such as the
"suitable home" requirement that flourished prior to King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The state
can ration benefits informally by setting a fixed number of job search contacts each claimant must
make or by empowering eligibility workers to exercise discretion over what type of verification to
require from a claimant or when to require a claimant to appear for an interview.
63. Although competitive systems are common when relatively small numbers of entities are
competing for government contracts or grants, they are difficult to design for mass public benefit
programs because of the difficulty of harmonizing standards across many reviewers. In addition,
competitive systems typically require postponing decisions until all candidates can be evaluated.
Such delay would interfere with many public benefit programs' abilities to meet claimants'
immediate needs.
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the democratic legitimacy of the resulting rationing. The following
Subsections address these differences in order.
1. Establishing and Modifying Informal Rationing Systems
Informal rationing systems differ from formal systems in the
multiplicity of ways in which they can be established. Since some formal
eligibility rules, such as time limits, can deter individual participation,
informal or choice-based rationing obviously can be established through
formal, overt public policy choices. Legislatures and senior program
administrators also can establish or modify procedural barriers or
disincentives to participate. In addition, these senior policymakers can
convey to lower-level administrative staff the desire to have informal limits
imposed, tightened, or relaxed.64 Where eligibility rules are set by statute
and administrators lack the legislature's support, manipulation of informal
rationing systems may be the main vehicle available for expanding or
shrinking a program.65
Perhaps more importantly, far more junior officials, ones with no role
in setting eligibility rules, can have major roles in setting the conditions
under which a potential claimant chooses whether to participate in a
program. They may do so through the exercise of officially designated
authority-by designating the interval between required eligibility reviews,
for example.66 But local managers, supervisors, and individual eligibility
workers also can-and perhaps more commonly do---change those
conditions through largely invisible modifications in the way they do their
jobs: the staff assignments they make, the information they do or do not
dispense, the level of scrutiny they give applications, their willingness to
make exceptions or accommodations, or their attentiveness in answering
their telephones and clearing filled voicemail systems. Since much of this
authority is difficult for state officials to oversee and effectively impossible
64. The methods by which senior officials can signal their subordinates are many and varied.
See generally Diller, supra note 36, at 1173-76 (describing the methods by which state
administrators have prompted local staffs to enforce work-related requirements in TANF-funded
cash assistance programs); David A. Super, Working for Food: The Food Stamp Program as
Model for a New Anti-Poverty Agenda, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2004) (on file with
author) (describing efforts to shift the food stamp program's orientation from cash assistance
recipients to low-wage workers).
65. The Clinton Administration found itself in this position when it sought to expand
Medicaid and food stamp benefits for working poor families after 1996. See generally Super,
supra note 64. Similarly, the Reagan Administration made some efforts to shrink means-tested
programs through informal methods after the congressional elections of 1982 made it difficult to
narrow eligibility legislatively. See, e.g., Food Stamp Program, 51 Fed. Reg. 7202, 7206 (Feb. 28,
1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 273.2 (2003)) (expanding the range of intrusive verification
procedures permissible in the food stamp program).
66. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f) (giving eligibility workers broad discretion to set the length
of the certification periods for successful food stamp applicants).
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to rescind, these local agency employees' role as de facto policymakers is
assured.
Nominally, the degree of state and local control over means-tested
benefit programs differs dramatically between those receiving TANF
funding-over which state control is virtually total-and the food stamp
program, which is subject to hundreds of pages of federal regulations; the
extent of federal control over Medicaid is somewhere in the middle. But in
fact, state and local officials have numerous opportunities to influence
claimants' choices-and the likelihood of procedural denials and
abandoned applications-under all three programs. Medicaid rules assume
an eligibility process more than they prescribe one.67 Even under the
supposedly prescriptive food stamp program, states and local offices have
wide flexibility to schedule appointments,68 decide how much verification
claimants must produce,6 9 impose work requirements,7 ° specify reporting
requirements between full eligibility determinations7 1 and set the interval
between those determinations. 72 Thus, the most important question about
state and local governments' informal rationing of these benefits is not
whether they can do it, but rather why they might wish to do so.
2. The Visibility ofRationing Systems
A second distinguishing feature of informal rationing systems is their
invisibility to those not directly involved in their administration. Part of this
invisibility is simply a product of the decentralized manner in which they
are imposed: Policymakers, analysts, and the news media are far more
likely to understand and remember a single set of rules set by a central
authority than they are to be able to integrate bits and scraps of information
about a plethora of locally designed policies. An advocate of open politics
and informed democratic participation in policymaking may condemn the
very invisibility that makes these strategies appeal to some legislators and
administrators. With eligibility rules increasingly poor proxies for a
program's actual performance, measuring its coverage and effectiveness
becomes problematic.
At least as important in keeping such rules invisible, however, is the
fundamentally different way in which they act upon claimants. Eligibility
rules' role in constraining participation in a program is obvious. Since
procedural rules exist in part to allow agencies to apply substantive
67. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.901-.920.
68. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(e), 273.14(b)(3).
69. See id. § 273.2(f)(2)-(3).
70. See id. § 273.7.
71. See id. § 273.12(a).
72. See id. § 273.10(f).
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eligibility rules, most will assume that whatever burdens they impose on
claimants are inevitable. 73 Only the most sophisticated observers are likely
to recognize the additional role of procedural rules as independent rationing
devices and to understand that they can be relaxed or tightened
considerably.
Most policymakers' and analysts' lack of familiarity with the brutal
realities of many low-income people's lives 74 also can cause them to
overlook the importance of informal rationing devices even when they
recognize those devices' existence. Even if an analyst is aware of a
procedure or of a policy that affects potential claimants' inclination to
participate, she may fail to recognize it as a rationing device. For example,
when an agency asks a claimant for copious proof of her income, most
observers are likely to see only an attempt to conform the reality of who
receives benefits to the terms of the program's income eligibility rules;
those income-eligible claimants who will be denied benefits for lack of
verification will largely be ignored..Still less obvious will be the impact
such policies have on potential claimants' decisions to seek benefits: Few
who have not experienced poverty are likely to think of the harried working
mother who fears losing her employer's respect and confidence if she seeks
his signature on a wage verification form.
The relative invisibility of informal rationing devices has several
consequences. Policymakers wishing to articulate one agenda and pursue
another can adjust the stringency of informal rationing devices with little
danger of being called on the inconsistency. At the same time it was
publicly espousing fiscal discipline, the Clinton Administration made
numerous changes in Medicaid and food stamp procedures to reduce
claimants' costs of participation and the risk of procedural denials. Its
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) adopted the convenient position
that changes allowing more already-eligible people to participate should not
be regarded as increasing the programs' costs because they were only
bringing in participants whom Congress already had decided to serve when
it enacted the programs' substantive eligibility rules.75 Conversely, as the
recent economic downturn has squeezed states' budgets, many have
dropped policies adopted a few years earlier to ease procedural burdens on
73. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO/RCED-89-4, FOOD STAMP
PROGRAM: ADMINISTRATIVE HINDRANCES TO PARTICIPATION 14-18, 21-25 (1988).
74. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (noting how the pressures on low-
income individuals can impair their abilities to advocate for themselves in the public welfare
system, particularly if they have no ongoing source of income).
75. See, e.g., Food Stamp Program: Noncitizen Eligibility and Certification Provisions,
65 Fed. Reg. 70,134, 70,142-43 (Nov. 21, 2000) (estimating the costs of two food stamp
regulatory changes that reduce the costs to households of receiving food stamps, and eliminate
procedural denials, without considering increased participation by substantively eligible
households).
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claimants for Medicaid. State policymakers apparently have reasoned that
these changes will go largely unnoticed, or can be explained away in
technical terms, while changing formal eligibility rules would be
understood as a retreat from efforts to reduce the ranks of the uninsured.
Yet the source of savings under both sets of policies is essentially the same:
fewer people receiving Medicaid coverage.
The relative invisibility of indirect methods can also allow
policymakers to ration benefits for a broader array of purposes than they
could readily hope to justify publicly. The upheavals of the mid- 1990s did
stretch the range of politically acceptable objectives for eligibility rules, at
least for a while. Traditionally, however, policymakers have had to justify
most eligibility rules under one of only a small handful of rubrics. Most
substantive eligibility rules are explained either as measuring need for a
benefit or worthiness to receive it. Once a basic need- or worthiness-based
rationing system is established, arguments about equity, reliability,
simplicity, or cost may lead to some fine-tuning. At some point, however,
restrictions on substantive eligibility without substantive justification can
expose policymakers' failure to fulfill their own stated programmatic
objectives. Discouraging participation may be a safer way to achieve the
same savings.
Even agencies that are unconcerned about benefit costs-perhaps
because some other level of government pays them--can nonetheless seek
to ration benefits as a way of preserving administrative resources. The
public may be unsympathetic to "bureaucrats" denying benefits to
concededly needy and worthy claimants "just to save themselves work," but
some administrators may feel that their staffing is so inadequate that they
have little choice. In a similar vein, administrators may feel they must limit
the number of "difficult" or "error-prone" cases they serve. And, of course,
the obscurity of informal rationing methods can help accomplish racist or
other invidious agendas.76
The relative invisibility of choice-based rationing also can allow
interventions whose ends have widespread political support but that could
not readily be implemented through eligibility rules without seeming too
heavy-handed. For example, when PRWORA eliminated King v. Smith's
prohibition on state-created social and behavioral eligibility conditions, 77 it
opened the door to a broad range of interventions to accomplish its stated
goals of promoting marriage and discouraging out-of-wedlock births. Yet
76. See, e.g., Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker
Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR.-AM. PUB. POL'Y 23 (1998)
(finding dramatic differences between the extent of supportive services offered to white and
African-American claimants).
77. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000))
(disavowing the individual legal entitlements that provided the basis for King v. Smith).
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although states clearly could have reinstated the "man in the house,"
"substitute father," or "suitable home" rules, none appears to have given
serious thought to doing so. Apparently the country had changed enough in
the intervening three decades that such overt interventions were no longer
politically palatable. Indeed, although those rules would likely reduce cash
assistance's roll as a subsidy to single-parent families, even the writings of
the Heritage Foundation's Robert Rector, one of the most fervent advocates
of making marriage a centerpiece of public welfare policy, avoid
advocating reinstating the pre-King rules.78 Instead, conservatives can
advocate giving states incentives to provide benefits to fewer unmarried
claimants and expect that states in turn will find informal, and hence
uncontroversial, ways of achieving that outcome.79
Curiously, hybrid rationing systems may be even less transparent than
purely informal ones. This is because they may leave the public misled
rather than merely ignorant. For example, if the public is told that relatively
few families were terminated under a state's time limit, it may assume that
the time limit had been set at a high enough level to avoid doing much
harm. In fact, many families may have left the roles early, experiencing
severe hardship, to avoid exhausting their months of eligibility completely.
3. Absolute or Probabilistic Control of Program Participation
In theory, eligibility rules determine precisely who will and will not
receive benefits, while the impact of choice-based systems depends on the
aggregate effect of individual claimants' responses to incentive systems. It
thus would appear that formal systems can target limited resources more
precisely than can informal systems. As the example set out in Subsection
78. See, e.g., ROBERT E. RECTOR ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., "MARRIAGE PLUS":
SABOTAGING THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS To PROMOTE HEALTHY MARRIAGE 1, 4-5, 7 (2003),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/BG1677.cfm (repeatedly insisting that marriage
promotion programs should be voluntary); ROBERT E. RECTOR, THE HERITAGE FOUND.,
YET ANOTHER SHAM WELFARE REFORM: EXAMINING THE NGA PLAN (1996),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/BG1075.cfm (arguing for giving states incentives to
promote marriage rather than having the federal government exert direct pressure on claimants).
79. Although not prominent in public discussions of marriage promotion, a particularly
inflexible regime of required cooperation in paternity establishment can have this effect. Since
husbands' paternity generally is presumed, these policies by definition apply only to women who
had children while unmarried. Limiting the number of putative fathers a woman may name before
becoming subject to a lifetime disqualification and requiring extensive information about the
whereabouts of putative fathers in order to deem the woman to be cooperating will deny benefits
to some of the unmarried mothers discussed at great length in the PRWORA's preamble,
42 U.S.C. § 601 note (Congressional Findings), without explicitly punishing their sexual behavior
or childbearing. Perhaps for nonemotive budgetary reasons, a number of states have been moving
to impose these sorts of policies. See, e.g., Smyth v. Carter, 168 F.R.D. 28, 32-33 (W.D. Va.
1996) (enjoining the state from terminating cash assistance to mothers who attest to their inability
to identify their children's fathers, often because of past substance abuse or a large number of past
sexual partners); Doston v. Duffy, 732 F. Supp. 857, 871-73 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same).
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II.B.1 showed, however, in practice most eligibility rules only crudely
approximate the policymakers' specific intentions for administrative
reasons. 80 Thus, it is difficult to generalize about which type of system has
the more precise impact.
Informal rationing systems' probabilistic impact, however, creates
significant challenges for policymakers, analysts, and the courts. Even if it
is certain that a practice will deter or prevent some eligible people from
receiving a benefit, it is not certain which particular individuals will be so
affected. With political, analytical, and legal discussions all traditionally
tending to start from the individual, this requires some difficult adaptation.
Critics of an eligibility rule typically seek to rally political opposition
by pointing to a seemingly needy and worthy person whom it would reject.
In opposing informal rationing systems, they can inveigh generally against
"heartless" or "incompetent" bureaucracy, but humanizing the argument
with an individual "victim" is difficult. At best, they will find someone who
lost benefits due to what they hope will be regarded as excusable neglect.
Even if they find someone with an appealing story, however, that story may
take longer to tell than policymakers, journalists, or members of the general
public are willing to listen. And it will usually be true that, with sufficient
advocacy assistance, any particular claimant could have surmounted the
obstacles. 81
More generally, policies that act probabilistically challenge some of our
basic assumptions about human nature. We think of a racist as someone
who wants to give nothing to people of color, and we think of an opponent
of granting public benefits to a particular population as someone who wants
to deny the benefits to everyone in that population. Our public and political
discourse lacks the tools to describe and counteract the racist who is
satisfied with reducing but not eliminating the benefits going to those in
disfavored groups or the program opponent who is content with a ten- or
80. For example, policymakers may wish to take into account the contributions a low-income
family receives from relatives in determining the family's need for benefits. In practice,
identifying and quantifying these contributions, which typically are made in cash or in kind, is
administratively impossible. Policymakers may try to deny benefits to some of these families by
requiring that the incomes and resources of close relatives that live together be considered jointly
in applying a means test. Even if eligibility workers implement this rule perfectly, they will deny
benefits to some genuinely desperate families whose relatives live with them, but refuse to support
them. This rule will also fail to affect families being supported by relatives living next door,
across town, or even across the country.
81. Indeed, advocates face significant ethical issues highlighting the case of a particular
claimant. In many instances, they could fairly easily obtain benefits for that claimant. Arguing that
a particular family is in dire need of aid while failing to help it get that aid seems hypocritical and
heartless. Providing that help, however, would destroy that family's effectiveness as an example
of the putative unfairness of the policy at issue. Convincing the public that a problem that
individual advocacy can remedy nonetheless deserves systematic attention requires making a
statistical case that the number of such problems outstrips available advocacy resources-a most
difficult argument to win and one that must be made with data rather than with sympathetic
claimants.
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twenty-percent reduction in participation. Specifically in the public benefits
arena, any administrative requirements will manifestly have some adverse
impact on participation, but some such requirements are inevitable. Few
reliable tools are available to identify those requirements that are having
substantially more impact on participation than is reasonably necessary.
Predicting the impact of a policy requires not only understanding its terms
and the burdens under which claimants must work, but also the signals and
incentives perceived by eligibility workers. A work requirement in the
hands of an eligibility worker taught to seek compliance will operate very
differently from a nominally identical requirement applied by one seeking
to reduce his or her caseload.
D. The Politics of Choice-Based Rationing
As described above, choice-based rationing can be quite elusive. The
very existence of these interventions, much less their purposes and impact,
can be difficult to discern. This Section analyzes the political forces driving
the rise of informal rationing. Its goal is both to understand the strength of
the appeal of this kind of rationing and to assess the diverse incentives and
motives of many senior and junior officials who may, be imposing or
adjusting these rationing systems.
The rise of choice-based rationing of public benefits affects both the
substance of political struggles over public benefit programs and the
locations where those struggles. take place. Subsection 1 considers the
varied political impulses that have provided the impetus for informal
rationing. Subsection 2 then shows that a much wider and more diverse
array of actors can control-informal rationing than could establish or modify
formal eligibility rules.
1. The Appeal of Choice-Based Rationing
The rise of informal rationing as the nominal force in organizing public
benefit programs reflects a confluence of factors. Some conservatives
clearly sought to increase the burden of the eligibility determination process
to discourage receipt of public benefits. It would be a mistake, however,
to view informal rationing as the conservative agenda triumphant. First,
82. According to two American Enterprise Institute commentators, job search requirements,
behavioral rules, and other new requirements-what they refer to as the "hassle" factor-
raise what economists would call the "cost" of being on welfare. By a rough calculation
that assumes recipients value their time at the minimum wage, these kinds of
requirements can reduce the advantage of being on welfare versus working by about 50
percent. In very low-benefit states, the advantage can fall to zero.
Douglas J. Besharov & Peter Germanis, Am. Enter. Inst., Welfare Reform-Four Years Later,
PUB. INT., Summer 2000, at 17, 22.
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were conservatives in a position to dictate the terms of the new public
benefits regime by themselves, they likely would not select informal
rationing as the theme. Some would prefer the complete abolition of these
programs; 83 others would prefer a regime in which benefits were strictly
conditioned on work.84 As instrumental as they were in destroying the old
order, however, conservatives have not been in a position to set the terms of
the new system unilaterally. Indeed, leading conservatives have
acknowledged that while polls show voters "'want adult welfare recipients
to work' they also still "'want the government to assist needy families."'
85
The reasons informal rationing has come to dominate the public benefits
landscape in fact are much more complex.
To the extent that choice-based rationing's roots are philosophical, they
extend far beyond the narrow right-wing core that piloted PRWORA to
enactment. Both our economic and legal systems place a high premium on
individual choice. It is the foundation of the market economy. Our legal
system would become almost instantly mired if parties could not be held to
the consequences of choices to waive rights in contracts or in legal
proceedings. We also accept that coerced or foolish choices can sometimes
be valid. Only in the most extreme cases will we find a contract to be
unenforceable because of the parties' unequal bargaining power. We allow
the use of plea bargains despite understanding that they are motivated by
the desire to avoid more serious penalties rather than by a desire to do
penance for a wrong. And on the basis of a few poorly chosen words we
will find suspects to have waived the fundamental rights in the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Thus, although choice-based rationing has
rarely been discussed in the context of public benefits law, such rationing
has a long history in American law, and it is quite natural for policymakers
to consider it.
86
83. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 227-28 (1984) (arguing for the abolition
of most or all means-tested family assistance programs above the local level to create stronger
work incentives).
84. See, e.g., RON HASKINS, WELFARE IN A SOCIETY OF PERMANENT WORK 9-10
(Northwestern Univ./Univ. of Chi. Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research, Working Paper No. 145,
1999), http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/Haskinswp.pdf; MEAD, supra note 14, at 233-34; RECTOR,
supra note 78, at 5-6.
85. Implementation of Welfare Reform Work Requirements and Time Limits: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002),
2002 WL 388673 [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Douglas J. Besharov, Resident Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute) (quoting New York University professor and fellow conservative
Lawrence M. Mead).
86. In numerous other areas of public law, policymakers have turned to choice-based
rationing strategies when changing explicit legal rules was constitutionally or politically
infeasible. After the Supreme Court prevented states from enacting formal prohibitions on
abortion, antiabortion legislators sought to limit the number of abortions by influencing women's
choices. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(accepting some such efforts while finding that others unduly burdened women's choices);
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1224-26
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Some may see stringent procedural requirements as having intrinsic
value: The process of navigating procedural barriers legitimizes the
claimant's receipt of the benefit. In this vision, which need not be motivated
by animus for low-income people, having to surmount some eligibility
barriers reminds the claimant that the benefit is a gratuity. Alternatively,
compliance with procedural requirements can be seen as a form of
consideration for the benefit ultimately received.
Choice-based rationing also can appeal to the deep-seated American
suspicion of bureaucracy. At least superficially, it appears to reduce the
heavy hand of state bureaucracy and to give low-income families more say
in determining their own fates. Indeed, the basic premises that
make informal rationing plausible-in particular, an active, volitional
claimant-have been popularized by the left. To be sure, the content of
choice-based rationing is far removed from the left's prescription of
expanded options, positive incentives, and. political empowerment.
Nonetheless, choice-based rationing might never have arisen had it not been
for the more dynamic image of public benefits claimants advanced by the
welfare rights movement 87 and liberal efforts to "make work pay" by
expanding benefits for low-wage workers.
88
The rise of choice-based rationing, however, has been driven more by
pragmatic state administrators than by social theorists of any stripe. With
(1996) (describing waiting periods as a device to induce more careful deliberations). The 104th
Congress, a few months before enacting PRWORA, applied an aggressive informal rationing
strategy to prisoners. Rather than explicitly authorizing brutality or oppressive conditions in
prisons, it imposed huge financial and procedural burdens on prisoners seeking redress from
federal courts. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810,
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
As a result, prisoners' petitions fell by thirty-six percent between 1996 and 1998 with no
significant change in the underlying substantive law. See James E. Robertson, Prison Reform, a
Faustian Bargain, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 195, 195 n.2 (1997). In the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress also sharply reduced state prisoners' access to relief through
writs of habeas corpus without explicitly denying the right to file writs after a prior unsuccessful
attempt. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
(2000)). A host of procedural rules made denials of first petitions more likely, and an even greater
array of hurdles allowed procedural denials of most successor writs. 1d. Yet when innocent
prisoners denied relief under this regime occasionally gained media attention, officials could insist
that the writ was still available and that any substantive injustice was chargeable to the prisoner's
own procedural defaults. See Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act: What's Wrong with It and How To Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 942 (2001) ("By enacting
Section 2244(b)(2), Congress has created the illusion that the federal courts are willing to consider
successor petitions in cases of innocence, while ensuring at the same time that no inmate will be
able to satisfy its stringent demands."). On the other hand, in Miranda v. Arizona the Court sought
to increase the likelihood that suspects would invoke their right against self-incrimination by
requiring that they be informed of that right. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Influencing suspects' choices in
this way can be seen as an alternative to stiffening the underlying substantive right.
87. See, e.g., FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 264-361 (1977).
88. See, e.g., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY
104-21 (1988).
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the traditional tools of formal rationing largely unavailable to many
policymakers feeling intense pressure to constrain receipt of means-tested
benefits, various forms of informal rationing have been adopted.
In particular, state policymakers-under intense media and scholarly
scrutiny before and particularly after PRWORA's enactment-have found
choice-based rationing systems to have two appealing political
consequences. First, they are far less visible than formal eligibility rules.89
Caseloads appear to drop as if guided by an invisible hand; most observers
are likely to believe that the invisible hand derives from reduced need and
families' greater ability to sustain themselves without cash assistance.90
Reporters and researchers may not recognize that rationing is taking place
or, even if they do, they will have difficulty explaining it to policymakers
and the general public.9' Second, even if these systems' role is understood,
the component of choice is likely to legitimate them in the eyes of many.
The public may have qualms about pulling the rug out from under needy
people with no alternatives, but it certainly is in no mood to force benefits
on people who seem to have chosen another path.92
The architecture of particular programs also may encourage
policymakers to prefer choice-based rationing systems. The vast majority of
states, for example, are meeting TANF's work requirements with the help
of the caseload reduction credit, which reduces states' required work
participation rate in lockstep with their reductions in welfare caseloads. 93 In
89. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1208-09; Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in
Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3, 5 (1984); cf Ruth Conniff, Radical Plan Would
Squeeze the Poor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 4, 1996, at 13B (criticizing a proposal to
tighten formal eligibility rules); George Hesselberg, Just Look at What a State We're in,
WIS. ST. J., Feb. 6, 1996, at IC (calling Governor Thompson's claim to have reduced welfare
caseloads thirty-three percent a "fudge" because "most of that decline came by jiggling the
eligibility and the basic benefit requirements").
90. See, e.g., Engler's Legacy: A Timeline, DET. NEWS, Dec. 30, 2002, at 6A (charting
retiring Michigan Governor John Engler's accomplishments over his twelve-year term in part by
declines in welfare receipt); Sheila McCarthy, Welfare-to-Work Effort Is Called Success as
Caseload Drops 50%, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 29, 1998, at 5B (treating caseload decline as the key
measure of the success of changes in welfare policy with little critical examination of how those
changes were achieved).
91. Less honorably, of course, this invisibility may appeal to those wishing to pursue
rationing agendas that could not win widespread political acceptance, such as easing
administrative burdens or permitting racial discrimination.
92. Administrators whose thinking has not fully made the transition from AFDC also may
reason that informal rationing techniques may be resistant to legal challenge since they do not
absolutely bar anyone from receiving benefits. These techniques thus may more reliably achieve
the desired savings than some legally suspect eligibility rules. In reality, however, absent any
(unlikely) state constitutional provisions to the contrary, states' legal ability to curtail eligibility
for TANF is almost plenary. See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) (prohibiting federal officials from
interfering with states' choices absent a specific federal mandate); see also Helen Hershkoff,
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1132 (1999) (proposing state constitutional theories to limit this near-plenary authority).
93. For the prescribed formula for calculating the participation rate, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 607(b)(3)(A).
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calculating the credit, however, states may not include caseload reductions
resulting from changes in federal or state eligibility rules. 94 Thus, the TANF
statute gives a strong preference to caseload reductions through informal
means.
TANF, the Child Care and Development Block Grant, and other
programs funded by fixed block grants in general have incentives to control
costs fairly rigidly. Some block grants may have limited ability to carry
funds forward from year to year (or to borrow from future years in the event
of a cost overrun); state administrators therefore may need to adjust
participation levels several times a year. Changing formal eligibility rules
may require time-consuming reprogramming of the state's computer
system, amendment of its manuals, and retraining of its eligibility staff.
Adjusting the stringency of informal rationing approaches-releasing
outreach materials if enrollment is below expectations or telling local
offices to verify eligibility rigorously-may-be a faster way of ensuring that
participation tracks available funding.
State and local officials' incentive structures in other programs, such as
Medicaid and food stamps, are more complex. On the one hand, such
programs provide important benefits to the state. Medicaid, for example, is
the federal government's largest grant-in-aid program to states. On the
other hand, Medicaid is also one of the largest and fastest growing
components of states' budgets. 95 Although both formal and informal
rationing methods can achieve savings, prior expansions of Medicaid
eligibility received so much public attention that they may be politically
difficult to rescind. Accordingly, states have been inclined to take less
visible routes, such as reducing the value of the Medicaid benefit package
(leaving beneficiaries still "insured," just less so) and reestablishing
burdensome eligibility determination procedures they previously had
abolished to encourage potential claimants to apply for coverage.96
Similarly, food stamps are federally funded, but the threat of quality control
penalties may deter states from granting benefits.
2. The Decentralization ofDecisionmaking on Informal Rationing
In analyzing informal rationing systems, it is necessary to consider the
motives of a much wider range of actors than it is for formal eligibility
rules. For example, state officials' incentives to issue food stamp benefits,
94. Id. § 607(b)(3)(B).
95. Medicaid costs typically consume about one-quarter of states' budgets. See, e.g., SMITH
ET AL., supra note 58, at 4-9.
96. See id. at 12; Amy Goldstein, States' Budget Woes Fuel Medicaid Cuts, WASH. POST,
Oct. 11, 2002, at Al (quoting Delaware's Medicaid director as saying that "[ilt's nuts to go out
there and drag people in if you can't even serve them or deal with them").
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which the federal government fully funds, and cash assistance benefits,
which come entirely from moneys within the state's control, are quite
different. Yet local officials generally pay for none of these benefits; 97 as a
result, they may be similarly eager or reluctant to provide each. They may
have no fiscal motive to withhold benefits, but they nonetheless may have
strong administrative or philosophical reasons to want to provide or
withhold benefits to some or all claimants.
As discussed above, much of the impetus for informal rationing has
been an imbalance between broadly accepted goals for cash assistance and
other means-tested programs-caseload reduction, error reduction, and cost
avoidance-and an unwillingness of politically accountable policymakers
to adopt explicit rules sufficient to accomplish those goals fully. Thus, the
locus of policymaking has passed to a considerable degree from senior state
officials-governors, legislators, and political appointees-to lower-level
managers on the state and local- level. These relatively junior officials are
tasked with achieving the state's goals but denied many of the formal
policymaking tools required to meet them. The result has been a great
increase in informal rationing.
Although legislatures theoretically retain the most power in these
systems, their visibility can sharply constrain their ability to exercise that
power in clear, directive ways. Conversely, although local administrators
remain nominally subordinate both to state political officers and to the civil
servants in state agencies' policywriting units, the relative invisibility of
local offices provides them with the greatest latitude to exercise discretion
and to vary the severity of informal rationing regimes.
Senior state officials naturally retain an interest in the operation of their
programs and may be reluctant to cede control to the whims of their local
subordinates. They may try to provide incentives for local officials to
follow the course they favor. Thus, analysis of informal rationing systems
may require exploring multiple layers of incentives." The more difficult it
is to understand why a program is operating as it is, the more likely
97. Roughly a third of the states require local governments to contribute to the costs of cash
assistance benefits, Medicaid, or both. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D
CONG., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN -BOOK 383, 386-87 (Comm.
Print 1994). This obviously could cause county managers to differentiate between benefits they
help fund and those paid entirely by the state or federal governments. These managers, however,
occupy but one tier in the bureaucracy. In any case, all of the benefits that lower-level managers,
supervisors, and eligibility workers distribute are funded at a level of government higher than
where they are sitting.
98. Of course, several layers of incentives and choices are possible within the government.
The legislature may threaten the welfare commissioner's personnel and travel funds to encourage
efforts to expand or limit participation; the commissioner may manipulate the incentives of
regional overseers who do the same for-county managers who in turn signal branch managers
what expectations they should impose on unit supervisors and eligibility workers.
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researchers and reporters will miss a step and fail to grasp the importance of
what is happening.
Unlike eligibility rules, informal rationing systems also can be created
by accident or by inaction.99 Procedural barriers to eligibility and
disincentives to seek benefits can easily result from inadvertent failures to
consider the problems claimants face or from the failure to address those
problems once realized. Many rules that would pose no difficulties to
middle-income people with stable jobs and residences, adequate
transportation, and multiple options for short-term childcare can be
devastating for low-income people lacking some of those advantages. Yet it
can be most difficult to persuade middle-income policymakers that they,
their predecessors, or their counterparts elsewhere in government have
narrowed access to benefits without any evidence that this was intended.1 °°
This can complicate analysis of informal rationing considerably. Not
only must policymakers or researchers recognize that a policy or practice is
affecting participation, but they also must consider whether it is deliberate
or the result of negligence or ineptitude. The possibility that no one
intended to tighten or loosen rationing of the benefit can deflect outsiders
from the search for someone who did. Neither public law nor our political
process deals especially well with policies that mimic unintended
consequences.101
E. The Efficiency, Equity, and Authenticity of Choice-Based Rationing
Given that powerful political forces are likely to rely on choice-based
rationing for the foreseeable future, it is incumbent on us to assess its
99. To be sure, many eligibility rules have consequences of an unintended nature or intensity,
and a few may be misdrafted. It is difficult, however, to create an eligibility rule altogether by
accident.
100. Moreover, many of the same philosophical, political, and administrative factors that can
cause some officials to tighten informal rationing, see supra Subsection II.D.1, can also induce
others not to search too closely for evidence that their subordinates may be seeking to constrain
participation in this way. For a cogent discussion of other ways in which devolution can interfere
with the transparent and efficient administration of public benefit programs, see Jon D. Michaels,
Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted
Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2004).
101. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-51 (1972) (finding no cognizable
equal protection issue where substantial differences between the public assistance benefit levels
paid to predominately white and predominately African-American and Latino groups could not be
shown to result from intentional racial discrimination). In trying to bring political pressure to bear
on complex systems such as public benefit administration, the biggest challenge often is getting
the public or nonexpert legislators to understand what policy is at issue. This difficulty commonly
is overcome by describing the policymaker's intended result without explaining the mechanics of
how she or he intended to get there. For example, in late 1994, liberals persuaded the public that
House Republicans wanted to put low-income children into orphanages not by explaining how
that might be done-inevitably a complex chain of events, if it was to happen at all-but rather
primarily because the Republican's speaker-apparent, Newt Gingrich, made the mistake of saying
that it might not be a bad idea.
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virtues and deficiencies. It is easy to caricature many strategies for
changing potential claimants' incentives to pursue a benefit. On those rare
occasions when politicians or the news media address them, they
commonly treat these policies as the results of bureaucratic ineptitude or
heartlessness. Liberal commentators often do much the same.10 2 Yet the
choice often is not between informal rationing and none at all, but rather
between these techniques and additional formal eligibility restrictions.
Presumably, a legislature or agency decides to ration benefits because it
believes that more people are receiving assistance than is fiscally,
politically, or ideologically acceptable. If an agency is forced to remove
administrative impediments to participation, it is unlikely to abandon its
determination to reduce its caseload. Thus, a more realistic assessment
would recognize these systems' significant appeal, as well as their
shortcomings, and compare them with the advantages and disadvantages of
the rule-based methods of rationing that dominated the three decades before
the 1996 welfare law and those of the social work model that preceded it.
One may disagree with informal rationing policies, but intelligent
policymakers could adopt them for coherent reasons.
This Section seeks to identify criteria for judging informal rationing
systems. In particular, it considers efficiency concerns, equity and
distributional problems with some informal rationing systems, and
questions about the quality of the putative choices upon which these
systems rely.
Analyzing the efficiency of informal rationing systems can be quite
complex. This analysis must encompass waste, or loss of value, of the
limited funds provided for means-tested benefits, the mistargeting of those
funds on claimants in less severe need, administrative costs, and the costs of
the perverse incentives some informal rationing systems create.
The efficiency of a formal eligibility rule customarily is judged by
comparing how much it improves the targeting of benefits (under whatever
norms the political process has selected) with the cost to the agency of
administering the rule. In informal rationing systems, however, many costs
are displaced to private actors, particularly claimants. Rationing methods
that lower the value of a benefit other than by directly reducing the depth of
the subsidy are inefficient in that the state is destroying some of the value
that it is paying to create: The state is paying to create a benefit of a certain
value and then destroying a part of that value to make the benefit less
102. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 88, at 141-42 (criticizing the burdens of the welfare
application process as a work disincentive); Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz
Kajka: The Maladministration of New York City's Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 231, 247-50 (1989-1990) (blaming inefficiency and skewed incentives for the
high rate of administrative terminations of eligible recipients' benefits in New York City).
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attractive. Such an action is, in effect, a benefit reduction without the fiscal
advantage to the state.1"3
Systems for deterring participation also may change claimants'
relationships with third parties in ways that produce similar inefficiencies.
Systems that give third parties influence over a claimant's chances of
obtaining benefits may compel the claimant to offer the third party an
inducement to cooperate. °4 For example, a landlord may insist that a
claimant become current on her rent before signing a verification form. If
the claimant was planning instead to move and take advantage of her
judgment-proof status, that will reduce the effective value of the benefit she
is seeking. Similarly, a worker may feel that she can only ask her employer
for a finite number of favors. If one of those favors must be spent on doing
the paperwork necessary for her to receive advance payment of the earned
income tax credit, 10 5 she may feel unable to ask for as much time off to
attend parent-teacher conferences or take her children to the doctor. Most
simply, if obtaining or retaining a benefit requires multiple office visits,
extensive document collection, job searches, or other activities demanding
substantial transportation or childcare resources,, claimants who pursue
benefits are likely to become indebted to, or exhaust the good will of, those
who provide those resources. This may leave the claimant less free to turn
to the same people for help when seeking or starting employment and may
make it difficult for the claimant to refuse their requests for favors that may
interfere with the claimant's plans to enhance her independence.
Informal rationing also is likely to entail substantially greater
administrative costs than tighter formal eligibility rules. Some of these
strategies may increase administrative costs for the state: Someone, for
example, must review claimants' verification, even if that function takes
substantially less time than it took the claimant to gather it. Officials
responsible for setting and adhering to budgets may fret that estimating how
many claimants will be deterred from applying is far harder than
determining how many a given eligibility change will render ineligible. If
participation is higher than is desired, ,administrators may be uncertain how
to calibrate the signals they send to their line employees to achieve the
desired degree of additional rigor. If an agency requires several iterations to
arrive at an informal rationing regime producing the desired level of
caseload reduction, it must incur the not inconsiderable administrative costs
103. This action not only deters participation by many of those with- lesser need, but also
reduces the value of assistance to those in greater need who feel compelled to absorb these costs
to get benefits.
104. To the extent that third parties are willing to assist the claimant without extracting rent,
the rationing system is imposing costs on them rather than the claimant. This remains an
inefficiency of the system.
105. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 32, 3507 (2000).
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of changing its systems and retraining its workers each time it makes an
adjustment.
Informal rationing may also produce an inefficient targeting of benefits.
Such rationing may make it more or less likely that a given type of eligible
claimant will participate, but it almost certainly will fall far short of
assuring a perfect fit between need and the provision of benefits. A
potential claimant with less need may happen to be neighbors with an
eligibility worker; a desperate family may have a close relative who was
convicted of fraud based on an innocent misunderstanding and overestimate
the risk of being accused. One family may be particularly greedy, another
unusually stoic. And although need and desire for assistance may be factors
in potential claimants' choices whether to participate, other factors may
well prove even more important for many families.
Moreover, policies that discourage receipt of public benefits may create
incentives, or promote behaviors, that many policymakers would regard as
perverse and inefficient. A time-consuming administrative process will
burden most those whose time is most valuable. That group may include
those with limited childcare resources, but it also includes low-wage
workers forced to take time off from work. Obviously, endangering one's
employment by taking time off to comply with a public benefit program's
burdensome administrative requirements is counterproductive for all
concerned. Workers also may be more vulnerable to stigma if identified as
recipients of means-tested benefits since they could face fairly immediate,
concrete consequences: the loss of their employers' confidence and the
opportunities that go with it. Those without jobs will not have this
vulnerability and hence may be less likely to be deterred.
106
Even when stigma does not deter destitute claimants, however, it may
still have counterproductive consequences. Individuals who already feel
beaten down may be demoralized further by being stigmatized. This could
leave them even less likely to project the confidence that will help them
become employed. Requiring claimants to make numerous job contacts and
to obtain employers' verification of their failed applications can make them
nuisances to local businesses and may persuade prospective employers that
low-income people care more about documenting failed applications than
doing what it takes to make successful ones.
Informal rationing systems also may raise serious equity concerns. On
the simplest level, strategies to restrict the availability of information can be
perceived as unfair. More broadly, rationing may have different, and often
regressive, impacts across subgroups of claimants. Some of these strategies
106. Of course, unemployed claimants are likely to have personal pride and may react
strongly to the prospect that their neighbors, landlord, or children's schools may discover that they
are seeking public assistance---or any implication that they may be suspected of fraud.
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may have the greatest deterrent effects on some of the neediest families. For
example, the burden of complying with many procedural requirements is
likely to depend on the claimant's literacy, math ability, organizational
and social skills, and childcare and transportation resources. 10 7 Yet the
claimants likely to be the weakest in those areas-and hence most
burdened-also are likely to have the poorest job prospects and hence be
the neediest. Similarly, the risk of fraud prosecution is likely to be greatest
for illiterate claimants (who must communicate orally or through unreliable
scribes), those with poor math abilities (who cannot readily recognize
whether their benefit amount seems to have been adjusted for income they
believe they have reported), and those with poor organizational and social
skills. And a time limit may be less of a deterrent to a family with solid job
prospects that is experiencing a modest reversal than it is for a much poorer
family that cannot imagine that it will ever be able to increase its earnings
much-and fears even harder times ahead. A family with more disposable
income may be less burdened by a benefit being provided in kind since it
has more cash expenses that the benefit can supplant. 0 8 A family with less
money also may simply lack the funds to make a required copayment even
if the benefit of doing so would be quite substantial. 0 9 More broadly,
claimants with significant disabilities and those facing linguistic or literacy
barriers may be disproportionately affected by many of these rationing
systems-even though they also face severe barriers in the employment
market.
Perhaps the most fundamental concern about choice-based rationing
systems is whether the outcomes they produce really do represent
claimants' and potential claimants' choices at all and, to the extent they do,
whether those choices have the qualities that make them legitimate bases
for allocating public resources. A low-income family that does not apply for
a benefit because it does not know that the benefit exists has not made a
107. In Medicaid, where some beneficiaries may have difficulty getting to services,
the failure to provide transportation long has been recognized as a formidable rationing
device. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1169-75 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (invalidating a
Pennsylvania system for assuring Medicaid transportation upon finding that it tended to deny
access to services to the most disabled beneficiaries).
108. For example, a $300 food stamp allotment need not affect the purchasing habits of a
family that is already spending $300 on food; the family could simply purchase the same amount
of food with the food stamps and spend the $300 of cash that it frees up on any other household
need. A poorer family that is spending less than $300 on food may have its spending choices
constrained.
109. This problem dogged the food stamp program for over a decade until the Food Stamp
Act of 1977 eliminated the requirement that most recipients purchase a month's supply of food
stamps. Pub. L. No. 95-113, sec. 1301, 91 Stat. 913, 958-79 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2027); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2016(b) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 95-464, at 170, 238-44 (1977).
It remains an ongoing source of contention in Medicaid. See generally OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, 103D CONG., BENEFIT DESIGN IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: BACKGROUND PAPER-
PATIENT COST-SHARING (1993) (describing research findings and controversy over cost-sharing
requirements' impact on healthcare utilization).
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choice at all; neither has a low-income family that does not apply because it
is wholly convinced, albeit wrongly, that it is ineligible. To say that the
families made a choice not to try harder to learn about government benefit
programs may be technically true, but normatively unpersuasive: The
choice to seek out information is difficult to equate with a choice not to
seek public benefits. A family that is denied public benefits due to a
procedural default-whether as part of the application process or for failing
to fulfill a behavioral requirement-may have made a conscious choice not
to continue its pursuit of the benefit (or to pursue it only halfheartedly), or
may sincerely have believed it was fully complying with the program's
requirements. If the latter, it is difficult to argue that the family's failure to
take additional steps to determine the adequacy of its compliance is the fair
equivalent of a choice not to receive benefits.
Failures to participate that appear to result from claimants' choices may
thus reflect decisions of third parties or simple random chance. Complex
procedural requirements can give third parties the effective power to deny
families' claims by refusing to provide required verification, by refusing to
entertain an application for employment proffered in compliance with a job
search requirement, by erroneously informing a potential claimant that she
is ineligible for benefits, or even by stealing mail from the agency out of the
claimant's mailbox. Effectively delegating control over claimants'
eligibility to landlords or fast food managers seems to have all of the vices
and few of the virtues of giving open-ended discretion to eligibility
workers. Similarly, random chance, such as postal delays and misdeliveries,
clerical errors or delays in processing papers that a claimant has submitted,
or a claimant's mistake as to when an eligibility worker might be available
to take a phone call, can result in procedural denials that cannot fairly be
attributed to choice.
Even where potential claimants clearly did consciously choose to
eschew benefits, questions can arise as to whether some of those choices
were sufficiently voluntary to provide valid bases for denying a public
benefit that may be crucial to the claimants' subsistence. Answering these
questions requires having an empirical assessment of the nature of the
choices a particular set of rules or practices imposes on potential claimants,
which in turn requires an appreciation of the diverse range of potential
claimants' capabilities and problems) l'0 It then requires a normative
110. The law evaluates the quality of choices in many other contexts: when criminal
defendants or others waive constitutional rights; when deciding whether to enforce an alleged
contract of adhesion; or when evaluating defenses of necessity, self-defense, incapacity, and the
like. Typically, however, these are fact-intensive determinations. That process is largely
unavailable here. To be sure, the facts of individual claimants' and potential claimants' choices do
indeed vary: For example, the same actions could mean one thing for a claimant who fully
understands her or his rights and options and quite another for one who is facing language,
literacy, or other barriers. But many of the same factors that often impair claimants' ability to
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judgment as to what kinds of choices are both fair and good public policy.
The reflexive and often covert manner in which informal rationing regimes
typically have been imposed, however, has left little room for these sorts of
reflections.
III. How PRINCIPLES OF CHOICE AFFECT THE DESIGN OF
PROGRAMS' SUBSTANTIVE ELIGIBILITY RULES
As developed in the preceding Part, the most important manifestation of
choice principles in the new world of public benefits law is in the
supplanting of formal eligibility rules with techniques of informal rationing.
The critical assumptions underlying the regime of choice-based rationing,
however, also have implications for the design of formal eligibility rules. In
particular, the assumption of an active, willful claimant that is a foundation
of choice-based rationing also suggests that incentives should be a central
consideration in the design of eligibility rules. 11'
In certain respects, tightening eligibility rules can create incentives that
advance some policymakers' goal of reducing receipt of means-tested
benefits. A time limit is an obvious example: Having only a finite number
of months of benefits available to a claimant in her or his lifetime gives that
claimant an incentive to find alternative means of support whenever
possible. In addition, the preference for choice-based rationing helps
determine which eligibility rules will be tightened and which groups of
claimants will bear the brunt of restrictions on eligibility. Those presumed
to have the most alternatives to means-tested benefits, or to have entered
their current predicament in part as a result of their own choices, become
prime targets for reductions-even if those presumptions are baseless.
In other respects, however, taking incentives more seriously can lead to
liberalizing rigid eligibility rules. Were the new regime to focus on
incentives only when -they result in reducing benefits, it could legitimately
be accused of hypocrisy. To their credit, many states, as well as some
federal policymakers, have moderated or cast aside some of the most
entrenched restrictive eligibility rules upon recognizing the perverse
incentives those rules created.
To be sure, the value of these liberalizations is diluted by the system's
overall campaign to make receipt of benefits unattractive. Those efforts
make knowing and voluntary choices to decline benefits for which they are eligible also prevent
the vast majority of those claimants from seeking adjudications that might free them from the
consequences of a choice that was not truly voluntary.
111. For a cogent critique of the single-minded emphasis on incentives in public benefit
programs, and a timely reminder that "incentives are not behaviors," see THEODORE R. MARMOR
ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING
REALITIES 219-22 (1990).
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reduce the significance of all substantive eligibility rules, both new and old.
Nonetheless, these changes can help some families in serious need now.
And, to the extent that the fairness of informal rationing can be improved
over time, these reforms will become more significant. In the meantime,
policymakers' adoption of incentive-based liberalizations can appropriately
be held up as a measure of their sincerity in building a constructive new
regime of public benefits law. As noted above, PRWORA's conservative
authors did not, and knew they could not, sell the legislation as an
indiscriminate purge of the rolls. The dogged retention of eligibility rules
that discourage or punish claimants seeking employment can be criticized
as exceeding the public's mandate for reform of public benefit programs.
This Part examines the influence that the increasing emphasis on choice
has had on the design of substantive eligibility rules over the past decade. It
argues that, in addition to criticizing the excesses of informal rationing,
advocates and scholars should scrutinize formal eligibility rules for their
fidelity to the new ideology of choice and incentives. Criticizing
inconsistencies between informal rationing techniques that seek to reshape
claimants' behavior and formal eligibility rules that implicitly assume that
the same behavior is immutable may help compel changes in one system or
the other-or call into question the basic good faith of the system.
Section A examines the ways in which the principal types of
nonfinancial eligibility rules have been restructured to reflect claimants'
actual or assumed choices. Although these changes give the appearance of
enhancing claimants' self-determination and less arbitrary governmental
control over who receives benefits, they may create serious inequities
where claimants in fact lack genuine choices. As with informal rationing
practices that rely upon spuriously imputed choices, these inequities can
and should be exposed. Section B explores how the orientation toward
choices has reshaped financial eligibility rules to facilitate and reward
certain types of choices. The choice-based approach has brought liberals
and conservatives together to relax the severity of means tests in some ways
that would have been unthinkable only a few years before. Advocates
should not allow the divisiveness of contemporary public benefits
debates-or their ambivalence about the exaltation of choice-to deter
them from taking advantage of these opportunities to form transitory
alliances to address these significant problems.
A. Nonfinancial Eligibility Rules
1. Requirements To "Earn" Eligibility
Some of the politically strongest public benefit programs-Social
Security, Medicare, veterans' benefits, and unemployment compensation-
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require claimants to have "earned" eligibility through their own work or the
work of close relatives. To the extent that AFDC covered families with two
able-bodied parents, it required one of those parents to have earned the
family's eligibility with several quarters of work."12 Similarly, the food
stamp program disqualifies many otherwise eligible college students but
makes an exception for those who are working.' 13 And transitional medical
assistance (TMA) is provided for up to one year to families whose earnings
have put them above the state's income eligibility limit for family
Medicaid.1 4 This policy clearly is intended as a reward for work effort: A
family whose income rises because it obtained Social Security or other
public benefits is ineligible for TMA. In none of these cases is an exception
made for people who were unable to work due to economic conditions or a
lack of marketable skills: Work is treated (somewhat fictitiously) as
dependent entirely upon a claimant's choice to work.
The 1996 welfare law similarly allowed some of those subject to its
nonfinancial eligibility rules to earn exemptions. Most of its limits on legal
immigrants' eligibility for means-tested benefits required that the
immigrant claim forty quarters of work under the Social Security system,
either based on her own work or that of her spouse or parents. " 5 Childless
adults whom PRWORA would otherwise limit to three months of food
stamps in each thirty-six-month period are exempt if they are working at
least twenty hours per week.
1 16
Most prominently, the TANF statute gives states incentives to require
most low-income families to earn means-tested cash assistance payments
through compliance with work and other behavioral requirements. Many
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1994), amended by Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2129.
113. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(e)(4) (2000).
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6. Receipt of TMA depends on both having received Medicaid
for at least three recent months based on having income under this eligibility limit and on being
employed. See id. §§ 1396r-6(a)(1), 1396u-l(b)(1)(A), (c)(2). Thus, this provision is a bit hard to
categorize: Both current work effort and a recent paucity of earnings are required.
Also, in a somewhat similar vein, Medicaid recipients with disabilities can maintain
coverage when they go to work if continuing Medicaid coverage is deemed essential to their
ability to work or under various other conditions. See, e.g., id. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XIll), (XV),
1396d(q), (s), (v), 1396o(g) (granting Medicaid eligibility to persons who would be unable to
work without services that Medicaid covers and preventing persons returning to work from the
disability rolls from losing Medicaid coverage immediately).
115. See 8 U.S.C. §§ I 183a(d), 1612(a)(2)(C), (b)(2)(C), 163 1(b). Similarly, work in the U.S.
armed forces provides an exception to many of these rules. See id. §§ 1612(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B),
1613(b)(2).
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(2)(A)-(B). The lack of marketable skills does not allow a claimant
who is unable to find half-time work to receive food stamps for more than three months. States
may, but need not, seek waivers from the time limit for areas with "insufficient jobs."
Id. § 2015(o)(4). Over forty states have obtained waivers for at least some areas, apparently
reasoning that sufficiently severe local economic conditions prevent a claimant's failure to work
from being fairly attributed to the claimant's choice.
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states also extend their time limits for claimants who are working or
complying with work requirements.
This vision of choice has significant flaws. Not only does it ignore
the plight of people who choose to work but are unable to find employment,
but it also takes an unduly narrow view of what constitutes "work" for
low-income parents (or, to put it another way, inappropriately assumes that
work outside of the home is the only valid choice for them). Were the
work of parenting considered a way to "earn" benefits, the condition of
low-income families in this country would be considerably better. Some
states' categorical rules for their TANF-funded programs now make
parents' compliance with certain minimum standards of performance (e.g.,
having their children immunized) a necessary condition of eligibility, but
except in the case of very young children, none makes parenting sufficient
to satisfy categorical requirements. It should perhaps go without saying that
the subjective judgments inherent in programs' definitions of what it means
to "earn" a benefit implicate deeper problems with society's failure to value
work traditionally done disproportionately by women." 7 This suggests a
limitation of the principle of choice. Low-income people are deemed
independent and capable of making their own decisions for purposes of
declining public benefits or committing acts deemed worthy of penalties.
Yet in their more important capacity as parents, they are deemed incapable
of making responsible decisions.
2. Linkages to Receipt of Other Public Benefits
Some programs tie eligibility to whether a claimant receives certain
other benefits, either positively or negatively. Rules disqualifying recipients
of one benefit from eligibility for another can be manipulated to induce
some low-income people to decline to receive one benefit for which they
may be eligible by offering another, less valuable one. In these cases, public
policies that degrade the value of a nominally more generous benefit to the
point that an inferior one seems preferable often go unnoticed. 
1 8
117. See, e.g., Beverly Leopold McDonald & Rita Diehl, Women and Welfare,
14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1036 (1981) (arguing that the most generous public benefit programs
are those that primarily serve men); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting
Definitions from Welfare "Reform, " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688,
732-41 (1998); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse
Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159 (1995) (describing the
propensity of the media, politicians, and the public to jump to broad negative conclusions from
anecdotal reports about low-income mothers, and to make policy accordingly).
118. An entirely separate kind of linkage between benefit programs is a rule that allows
receipt of one benefit to satisfy some or all of the eligibility criteria for another. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1758(b)(2)(C)(ii)(I)-(II) (granting automatic eligibility for free school meals to TANF
and food stamp recipients); id. § 8624(b)(2)(A)(i), (iii) (granting automatic eligibility for energy
assistance). Where these linkages exist, a more rigorous regime of rationing in one program is
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In recent years, state and federal policymakers have applied this
principle to conceal benefit reductions behind the principle of choice.
States' TANF-funded programs offer applicants a lump-sum diversion
payment in exchange for accepting an extended period of ineligibility for
ongoing cash assistance. The lump sum generally is only a modest fraction
of the value of the monthly benefits lost"19 but may be appealing to a family
in dire immediate need-or to one that does not relish ongoing involvement
with the welfare office.
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), enacted in
1997, assures beneficiaries far less comprehensive benefit packages, higher
cost-sharing, and less accessible application processes than Medicaid.1
20
Medicaid coverage thus is likely to be more beneficial to the poorest
families, who have little other recourse for obtaining expensive healthcare
and may be deterred by substantial cost-sharing requirements. 12 1 To ensure
that states' efforts to promote their separate SCHIP programs do not
displace Medicaid, the SCHIP statute requires states to screen all applicants
for possible eligibility for Medicaid and to enroll them if they are
eligible.122 Some states, however, have sought to stigmatize Medicaid as
welfare, causing claimant families to seek to enroll their children in the
cheaper but more respectable SCHIP programs.
The food stamp program's relationship with the Emergency Food
Assistance Program (TEFAP) is not wholly analogous since the same
household can receive benefits under both programs. Nonetheless,
congressional Republicans have repeatedly, trimmed funds from food
stamps-making benefit cuts deeper in 1996 and increases smaller in
2002-to purchase commodities for TEFAP to distribute through
emergency food programs. 2 3 The value of the typical TEFAP benefit is far
less than the food stamp allotment for all but the least needy households.
Many emergency food providers, however, promote TEFAP as a
likely to reduce participation in others. These potentially unintended consequences provide an
additional reason for concern about and close study of new informal rationing systems.
119. In states where the lump sum does not count against state time limits-it is not
"assistance" under 45 C.F.R. § 260.31 and hence does not count against federal time limits-a
calculation of the relative values of the two benefits becomes more complex.
120. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b) (generally allowing states to seteligibility standards
and procedures in SCHIP), with id. § 1396a (detailing claimants' entitlement to Medicaid
benefits).
121. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING: THE IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS (2003), http://www.kff.org/content/2003/4072/4072.pdf; LEIGHTON Ku, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CHARGING THE POOR MORE FOR HEALTH CARE:
COST-SHARING IN MEDICAID 1 (2003), http://www.cbpp.org/5-7-03health.pdf.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb(b)(3)(B).
123. Compare, e.g., S. 1117, 104th Cong. §§ 804-820 (1995) (setting forth a Democratic
proposal for few food stamp reductions and no new mandatory spending for TEFAP), with
S. 1795, 104th Cong. §§ 1013-1038, 1071 (1996) (setting forth a Republican proposal for
additional and deeper food stamp reductions and new spending on TEFAP).
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bureaucracy-free alternative to food stamps. The welter of behavioral and
procedural requirements that federal and state governments have attached to
the food stamp program in recent years makes that alternative appealing. In
effect, TEFAP offers households a chance to buy their way out of the food
stamp program's burdensome informal rationing procedures by making do
with a less valuable TEFAP benefit.1
24
B. Replacing Means- Testing with the Invisible Hand
Traditionally, public benefit programs' financial rules have been
regarded as one of the most objective aspects of eligibility determination.
Those with less were eligible while those with more were not. Among those
who were financially eligible, many programs provided greater benefits to
those with the least. The analysis was largely static: How a claimant came
to have the income or resources she or he did was largely irrelevant. Of all
forms of state rationing of benefits, the major thrust of these rules-that
benefits should follow objective need-was among the least
controversial. 125 Liberals and conservatives may have differed about how
many people a program should serve, and hence about how high or low
these standards ought to be, but the principle of looking at a claimant's
current means was broadly accepted.
The income and resources a claimant possesses, however, reflect in
significant part some choices that she or he has made. As means-tested
programs have moved increasingly to managed choice 126 as a rationing
strategy, this aspect of choice has become increasingly difficult to ignore.
124. Republicans' preference for TEFAP certainly reflects to some extent their growing
affection for private charities as delivery mechanisms for social services. Yet TEFAP is hardly a
private charity: The federal government, not private donors, purchases the commodities TEFAP
delivers.
The bias in favor of TEFAP is ironic since it denies the choice of what foods to purchase that
food stamp recipients enjoy; choice in the capacity of a consumer, clearly, is not respected to the
same degree that other types are. Similarly, the movement over the last decade to require
Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans, occurring simultaneously with
the blossoming of choice-based behavioral requirements and rationing systems, shows that
low-income people's choices as consumers attract little respect.
125. Of course, there was plenty of controversy about the precision of those measures. E.g.,
Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184 (1985) (finding that Congress intended to calculate AFDC
eligibility based on gross wages, not take-home pay); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 254
(1974) (prohibiting states from counting earnings not "actually available" to claimants under a
prior AFDC statute); Hamilton v. Madigan, 961 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1992) (excluding relocation
payments to homeless families from food stamp income calculations); New York v. Lyng,
829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing the Department of Agriculture to count restaurant
allowances to homeless families as income for the purposes of determining food stamp
eligibility).
126. The term "managed choice" seems a fair moniker for this new regime. Claimants'
choices about whether to seek government benefits are an inevitable part of any program's
operations. What distinguishes this new approach from prior practice is the degree to which
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1. Income Eligibility and Claimant Choice
Prior to the 1990s, means-tested programs' recognition of choices
varied considerably. The food stamp program offered a standard
deduction, 127 an earned income deduction of 20%,128 and reduced benefits
by only thirty cents for each additional dollar of income.' 2 9 Thus, net of
food stamp benefit reductions, claimants retained the first hundred or so
dollars that they earned plus 64% to 76% of the remainder.
1 30
Through most of AFDC's history, on the other hand, its income rules
did little to encourage employment. Initially, this was because AFDC was
seen as a pension for widows who should be caring for their children rather
than working outside the home. Even when AFDC decided that mothers
should seek paid employment, it generally treated this as a moral obligation
that claimants ought to honor without financial inducement. Those caught
defying this obligation could be sanctioned, but the program had no reason
to bribe claimants to fulfill their moral duties. Thus, for its first three
decades, AFDC generally taxed earnings dollar for dollar. The earnings
disregards introduced in the late 1960s were puny indeed: Claimants could
retain the first thirty dollars they made plus only one-third of the remainder.
In 1981, however, even these disregards were restricted to the first few
months of employment.
1 31
Medicaid retained the "thirty and one-third" disregards in 1981 and
added a year of transitional medical assistance (TMA) later in the 1980s for
claimants earning their way off of AFDC. 132 Given the value of Medicaid
benefits and the difficulty of replacing them on the private market,
however, one nonetheless could argue that Medicaid punished claimants'
decisions to seek and continue employment more severely than any other
means-tested program.
The programs' passive approach to claimants' choices about working
was inconsistent both with the vigorously pro-work ideology of welfare
policy in the 1990s and with the broader trend toward replacing formal
officials at all levels of government seek to influence, or manage, those choices to achieve
particular substantive results desired by the state.
127. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1988) (amended 1990). This provision is still in effect today, in
substantially the same form. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (2000).
128. Id. (1988).
129. Id. § 2017(a) (amended 1990). This provision is still in effect today in substantially the
same form. See 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (2000).
130. The amount claimants could retain depended somewhat on interactions with the excess
shelter expense deduction. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (1988). For households with high shelter costs,
this deduction increased the amount of income that the household could retain before its benefits
began to be reduced but then increased the rate at which those reductions phased out its benefits.
131. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat.
357, 843-44 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1994) (repealed 1996)).
132. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 303(a), 102 Stat. 2343,
2385-93 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6 (2000)).
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rationing rules with techniques for managing claimants' choices.
Connecticut provides an extreme example of the response. It adopted what
amounted to a full disregard of earnings up to the poverty level and
replaced means-testing with a twenty-one-month time limit.133 Thus, for all
practical purposes its cash assistance program abolished its formal income
test and allowed potential claimants to decide for themselves whether they
would receive cash assistance. The short time limit, however, constrained
those choices severely. A family could choose to receive a full cash
assistance grant on top of poverty-level earnings, but in doing so it would
use up a month of eligibility that it might need later on when it had no
income at all.
Initial evaluations suggest that many families did not subordinate
present need to protect their future eligibility and used up their twenty-one
months while making significant earnings. 134 The cause of these apparently
imprudent choices is unclear. Some may reflect program administrators'
failure to explain properly the tradeoffs being imposed on these families.
Some of it may be inevitable adjustment difficulties surrounding a radically
new system-a lag in claimants' understanding that financial eligibility had
suddenly become far less important in Connecticut's program. Some of
these choices may indicate that the current needs of families with wages at
or below the poverty line are so great that these families are unlikely to be
able to make what more affluent people would regard as economically
sound choices. Ultimately Connecticut did allow a substantial number of
extensions to the time limit, but these too were based on recipients' choices
to comply scrupulously with state-designed work requirements. 135 Thus, a
fallback from formally unstructured choice coerced by severe consequences
became a series of compliance choices closely structured by the state.
No other state replaced means-testing with managed choice as
completely as Connecticut. Many other states, however, coupled strict time
limits with liberal earnings disregards or exclusions of some part of child
support collections from means tests. 36 Only a small handful sought to
protect claimants from a choice between meeting immediate needs for
income supplementation and having a safety net available for future periods
133. See DAN BLOOM ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., JOBS FIRST:
FINAL REPORT ON CONNECTICUT'S WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVE 2-4 (2002).
134. See id. at 60-62.
135. See id. at 68-71.
136. Compare State Policy Documentation Project, Findings in Brief: Time Limits, at
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/timelimits/timelimitexpl.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) (finding that
twenty states have TANF time limits shorter than the federally prescribed sixty months), with
State Policy Documentation Project, Financial Eligibility for TANF Cash Assistance, at
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/financial/finansumm.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter State
Policy Documentation Project, Financial Eligibility for TANF] (finding that all but five states
liberalized their treatment of earnings in calculating financial eligibility from AFDC rules).
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of joblessness.137 Thus, in the great majority of states, claimants' choices of
whether to "bank" months on their time limit replaced means-testing.
Indeed, attaching these unpleasant consequences to the receipt of benefits
undoubtedly reduced the cost of more liberal income exclusions, and may
have made these liberalizations politically viable.' 38
2. Resource Eligibility and Claimant Choice
Resource eligibility rules, too, have been revised heavily with an eye
toward claimants' choices. Previously, rules that denied benefits to
claimants with resources exceeding a certain amount generally did not
purport to focus on any decision claimants might have made. Instead, the
simple presence of the resource was enough to trigger the rule. Particularly
as they applied to nonliquid assets such as motor vehicles, these rules
focused less on what claimants might or might not be able to do 139 and
more on the resentment of taxpayers to paying for benefits for people with
substantial assets. 
140
137. Illinois does not count months during which a parent has earnings for at least twenty
hours per week toward a family's TANF time limit. Maine and Missouri apply similar policies to
smaller subsets of their working families. See Liz SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STATE CHOICES ON TIME LIMIT POLICIES IN TANF-FUNDED PROGRAMS (1998),
http://www.cbpp.org/9-1-98wel.htm. Michigan and Vermont do not time limit cash assistance.
LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WAYS THAT STATES CAN SERVE FAMILIES
THAT REACH WELFARE TIME LIMITS 1 n. 1 (2000), http://www.cbpp.org/6-2 1 -00wel.pdf. In other
states, however, this dilemma appears quite widespread: Over 800,000 families receiving TANF
include a member working at least half-time, and another 750,000 families with such a worker are
financially eligible for, but not receiving, TANF. KATHERIN ROSS PHILLIPS, EARNING BACK
TIME: WHO WOULD BENEFIT FROM WORK-RELATED TIME LIMIT EXEMPTIONS? 4 (Urban Inst.,
Assessing the New Federalism Series No. B-50, 2002), http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/
310569_b50.pdf.
138. In Medicaid and food stamps, without similar time limits, the same tradeoffs did not
apply. To be sure, TMA and food stamp eligibility for many childless adults was time limited.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6. But months of eligibility on the transitional
Medicaid "clock" cannot be "banked" for future use, and the food stamp time limit-three
months-arguably is too short to present a meaningful tradeoff between current and future use of
benefits. Indiana did attempt to extend this principle of claimant choice to Medicaid by running
beneficiaries' TANF clocks during months of Medicaid receipt; it abandoned this policy under
HHS pressure.
On the other hand, neither program experienced the same sort of liberalization in the
treatment of earned income. States raised Medicaid's income eligibility limits but generally did
not do so for any particular type of income. The food stamp program changed accounting rules in
ways that resulted in some wages being ignored for up to six months. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(f)(1);
7 C.F.R. § 273.12(a)(1)(vii), (0(4) (2003). The program's basic earned income deduction and
benefit reduction rate did not change.
139. See, e.g., Alexander v. Glickman, 139 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying food stamps to
a claimant based on a vehicle that was concededly so heavily encumbered that the claimant could
not obtain significant funds by selling it). But see David A. Super, 1990 Farm Bill's Inaccessible-
Resource Provision Applies to Vehicles, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1343 (1993) (arguing that
Congress no longer wished to deny benefits to such households).
140. The House Agriculture Committee, for example, cited public resentment and criticism of
presumed affluence among welfare recipients rather than any impact on a family's need for food
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Under the welfare reform demonstration projects of the early 1990s and
states' TANF and Medicaid programs later in the decade, attention shifted
to the claimant's decisions. Where the claimant had substantial amounts of
readily available cash, most states concluded that she or he ought to spend it
on subsistence rather than seeking cash assistance.14 1 But states divided on
whether possession of cash ought to disqualify a low-income family from
receiving health coverage, particularly for its children. 142 Presumably this
difference reflects the difficulty of purchasing affordable individual health
insurance policies.
For other assets, however, states widely shifted their focus to the
decisions their eligibility rules were thrusting upon claimants. A rule
denying subsistence benefits to a claimant based on her or his possession of
a motor vehicle implicitly criticizes the claimant's failure to sell that
vehicle or at least suggests that selling the vehicle is a preferable means of
obtaining the funds to subsist. With vehicles essential to finding and
keeping employment in much of the country, states no longer wanted to
encourage low-income people to dispose of their cars. Thus, a great many
states excluded many or all cars from their vehicle tests for cash
assistance; 143 even more did so for Medicaid. 144 Beginning in July 1999,
as a reason for establishing the food stamp vehicle rule that rendered many low-wage working
families ineligible because of the value of the vehicles they drive to work:
[T]he Committee does not intend. to tolerate abuses of the kind that make the
program subject to public criticism. If there is such a thing as a welfare Cadillac, there
ought not to be. The Committee bill would treat Cadillacs and Rolls Royces and
Bentleys or Mercedes Benzes or excessively expensive sports car[]s, even if used for a
household member's employment because it transports its owner to work, as items
leading to, almost conclusively, ineligibility. It is not necessary to drive to work in such
cars .... However rural an area, a household does not have to have a new or slightly
used luxury car to traverse the distances.
H.R. REP. No. 95-464, at 89 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2067. Although the
Committee is obviously right that plain cars can carry one to work as well as expensive ones, that
fact has little relevance to an impoverished family that happens to have a more expensive car. The
Committee's fair market value test disqualified families that could not sell their cars for
significant gain due to encumbrances.
141. See State Policy Documentation Project, Asset Limits as of December 1998 (1999),
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/financial/asset.pdf (reporting that only Ohio does not have an asset test
for TANF cash assistance and-that all but three other states impose asset tests of between $1000
and $5000 on applicants for assistance).
142. See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ELIMINATING
THE MEDICAID ASSET TEST FOR FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF STATE EXPERIENCES 18 (2001),
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/2239/2239.pdf (finding that thirteen states and the District of
Columbia apply no asset test to families seeking Medicaid and that all but three of the remaining
states have liberalized the asset tests they inherited from AFDC).
143. See State Policy Documentation Project, Financial Eligibility for TANF, supra note 136
(reporting that twenty-three states exclude the value of at least one car per family in determining
eligibility for cash assistance, while twenty-seven states exclude part of the value of a car).
144. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 142, at 18-20 (finding that twenty-two states disregard the
value of at least one vehicle per family while another nine states have no asset limit at all).
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first the Clinton Administration145 and then Congress 146 took a series of
actions to allow states to import the liberal vehicle policy from cash
assistance and TANF-funded service programs into the food stamp
program.
In addition, as conservatives came to see poverty as the result of a lack
of thrift and savings (i.e., bad choices), it became increasingly difficult to
justify resource policies that pushed claimants to choose consumption.
While their forebears had won enactment of a statutory provision explicitly
requiring the food stamp program to count individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) as resources,147 conservatives now supported the 2002 Farm Bill,
which allowed states to exclude retirement savings from financial eligibility
determinations. 148 Similarly, PRWORA and legislation enacted by the
following Congress gave states broad options to establish "individual
development accounts" (IDAs) that would not count as resources so long as
the claimant did not spend the contents except for approved purposes, such
as purchasing a home or paying for education.149
In cash assistance programs, however, all of these changes took place
against the backdrop of time limits. Claimants with dependable cars might
no longer be ineligible for assistance, but they nonetheless might be unwise
to apply for benefits if they had any alternatives. Thus, although these
resource exclusions generally enjoyed broad support across the political
spectrum, they could operate as traps to unwary claimants or those with
145. See Food Stamp Program: Noncitizen Eligibility and Certification Provisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. 10,856, 10,877-78 (proposed Feb. 29, 2000) (to have been codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273)
(excluding vehicles that households would be unlikely to sell for a return exceeding half of the
food stamp program's resource limits); Food Stamp Program: Noncitizen Eligibility and
Certification Provisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,134, 70,170-71 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.8(e)-(f) (2003)) (liberalizing the rules further for households with more than one vehicle);
Letter from Susan Carr Gossman, Deputy Administrator, Food Stamp Program, to Regional
Administrators-All Regions (July 14, 1999), http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/rules/Memo/
Support/99/raletter2.htm; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES' VEHICLE
ASSET POLICIES IN THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM (2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/7-30-Olfa.pdf
(summarizing the current rules and states' take-up of options to liberalize vehicle asset policies).
146. See Act of Oct. 28, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 847, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-66
(codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(g)(2)(D) (West Supp. 2003)) (allowing states to extend to the food
stamp program any vehicle exclusions in their assistance programs operating under the TANF
statute, including policies disregarding all vehicles); Food Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4107, 116 Stat. 134, 308 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(g)(5)-(6))
(allowing states to exclude other kinds of resources).
147. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, sec. 1301, § 5(d)(8), 91 Stat. 913, 975
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g)(2)(B)(v) (2000)).
148. Food Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2002 § 4107 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(g)(6)).
149. Assets for Independence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-285, §§ 401-415, 112 Stat. 2702, 2759-72(1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604 note); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2125-28 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 604(h)); see also CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., 2002 FEDERAL IDA BRIEFING BOOK:
How IDAs AFFECT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS (2002), http://www.cbpp.org/
10-29-02wel.pdf (explaining various legal statuses of IDAs and the prospects for excluding each
type from financial eligibility calculations).
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unfounded optimism about their ability to subsist without cash assistance in
the future.
IV. LAW AND ADVOCACY IN RESPONSE TO
CHOICE-BASED RATIONING STRATEGIES
The tumultuous period culminating in PRWORA's enactment
fuindamentally transformed the way in which public benefits are rationed. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that the nature of law and advocacy in
this new world also has changed dramatically. The relatively
straightforward sources of legal authority and advocacy techniques that
prevailed in the pre-1996 regime characterized a formal system in which
authority was centralized and policy transparent. These legalistic advocacy
techniques' effectiveness had been waning for some time. The 1995 legal
services restrictions and the 1996 welfare law accelerated and solidified the
deterioration of the old advocacy regime, but it was already quite
dilapidated.
To address the subtler and more diffuse problems, the new system of
choice-based rationing requires a much more complex process of legal
advocacy and change within these programs. Where, for example, policies
discourage rather than deny claims for benefits, it could be difficult to
establish standing to sue, much less establish the violation of one of the
relatively few rules that still govern states' cash assistance programs.
Similarly, few if any of the arguments for incentive-enhancing
liberalizations of eligibility rules advanced in the preceding Part are
judicially cognizable. Yet even where formal eligibility rules remain, as
discussed in Part III, the ineffectiveness of the old, legalistic advocacy
approaches strongly suggests that something new is needed.
To complicate matters further, the rise in informal rationing
has coincided with broad changes in relationships within the ranks of
programs' supporters and in the advocacy methods by which that support is
expressed. In particular, the legal services organizations that formed the
backbone of the community advocating for public benefits claimants from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s were shrunken and hamstrung by
appropriations restrictions enacted a year before PRWORA. 150 A handful of
members of that community "spun off' into independent organizations
relying exclusively on nonfederal funding. For the most part, however,
advocacy for fairer and more efficient programs must be carried out by a
different group of people operating in a different set of forums.
Choice-based methods will not disappear any time soon from
dominance in rationing public benefits, particularly cash assistance. The
150. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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forces supporting them are too strong, and they provide too many practical
benefits to a wide range of policymakers and administrators. As Part III
demonstrated, the ideology of choice has begun to reshape longstanding
substantive eligibility rules. Indeed, as shown in Part II, .properly
constructed choice-based methods can actually provide better targeting of
benefits than is practical through rigid eligibility rules alone. A wide range
of choice-based techniques, however, is in use. Advocacy has an important
role to play in discouraging methods that are particularly likely to produce
putative choices that misrepresent the true desires and needs of claimants.
Advocacy also can be vital to protecting groups of claimants especially
vulnerable to coercion, such as racial minorities, persons with disabilities,
and, ironically, low-wage workers. Finally, advocacy can be essential to
ensuring that the theory of the active, volitional claimant is applied to
provide improved supports for low-wage workers as described in Part III.
This Part examines the implications of the ideology of choice for
advocacy on behalf of low-income people. The first Section considers the
decline in traditional advocacy concepts-reliance on a few, formal sources
for the applicable law, adversarial litigation and fair hearings for dispute
resolution, and the attorney-client relationship. The legalistic approach was
unable to avert the formation of the new regime and seems unlikely to
prosper under it without significant modification. The second Section then
sketches some of the alternative methods that have begun to emerge to fill
the increasingly obvious gaps.
A. The Declining Importance of Formal Modes of Legal Advocacy in the
Choice-Based Public Benefits System
The rule-based public benefit system arose largely in response to King
v. Smith,15 1 which held that claimants could not be denied benefits on
grounds not recognized in federal law, and Goldberg v. Kelly,152 which
recognized continued receipt of means-tested benefits as a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. The resulting system of legal
advocacy revolved around a few basic principles. First and most obviously,
the content of public benefit programs was set out in written rules that
could be analyzed for legal and policy deficiencies. Second, violations of
those rules in individual cases, or factual disputes, could be addressed
through administrative fair hearings. Third, fundamental legal deficiencies
with those rules-inconsistencies with federal or state regulations, statutes,
or constitutions-could be addressed through litigation, commonly class
actions filed in federal courts. And most importantly, advocacy would take
151. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
152. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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place primarily through the attorney-client relationship. Today, all of these
principles have eroded severely. The sources of this erosion are diverse.
The rise of choice-based rationing, however, has exposed and accentuated
deficiencies that were already present.
1. The Proliferation of Sources of Public Benefits Law
Studying public benefits law after PRWORA requires an expanded
notion of what law is, how law changes, and how law relates to politics.
Public benefits law is widely regarded as being heavily rule-based. For
many reasons, that is decreasingly the case. On the global level, the
rulemaking process federally and in many states has been unable to keep up
with the process of policy change. Budgetary factors drive public benefits
policy more immediately and directly than at any time in the past. State and
federal legislators often finish their budget only shortly before--or, at
times, somewhat after-the start of the fiscal year it is intended to govern.
Even a highly accelerated administrative process could not produce rules
before much of the fiscal year has passed, leaving savings unrealized or
benefits the legislature meant to offer unclaimed. In many agencies, the
levers of informal rationing may be easier to manipulate without
undertaking rulemaking.
Moreover, as program policy becomes increasingly politicized,
achieving consensus on even relatively simple choices becomes
problematic. Avoiding official rulemaking narrows the range of actors
aware of the policy being made and increases the chances of consensus.
Simultaneously, it reduces the number of "chokepoints" at which a
disaffected actor has the opportunity to block a pending policy."' The
process of policy development thus was guided in significant part by what
agencies believed they could accomplish without promulgating regulations,
within the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act's exemptions from
informal rulemaking.1
54
153. This is particularly true at the federal level, where the 104th Congress deliberately
sought to increase the number of such chokepoints in the hope of slowing down the regulatory
process. See, e.g., Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review ofAgency Regulations,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1997) (finding ambiguities in the congressional review procedures that are
likely to complicate agencies' tasks even where Congress does not overturn their rules); Thomas
0. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123
(1997) (describing new regulatory procedures as an effort to expand the range of persons who
may impede agencies' rulemaking). One could argue that in the public benefits arena this
initiative was somewhat self-defeating: It slowed the promulgation of the same policies that
Congress imposed through PRWORA.
154. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(b), (d). The most obvious exception-for public grants and
benefits-was unavailable since HHS long ago waived that exception and the Food Stamp Act
explicitly overrides it. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c), 2014(b).
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In addition, increasing emphasis on federalism has limited federal
agencies' legal authority and political capacity to regulate states.155 One of
the areas in which federal regulation remains most politically acceptable is
financial accountability. Thus, substantive policy choices increasingly are
buried in accounting guides. 156 Beyond that, much policy guidance is
provided through informal and largely invisible interactions between
agencies' regional offices and states. The same phenomenon exists in many
states.
In addition, rules have proven unsuitable to accomplishing either of two
major opposite impulses in public benefit program policy. Most obviously,
they are inconsistent with the desire to increase the scope of eligibility
workers' discretion, to replace broadly drawn entitlements with
arrangements in which a claimant must persuade an eligibility worker of his
or her worthiness for benefits. Because rules must be interpreted, however,
they also are inconsistent with desires for greater uniformity in some
aspects of program administration. The demand for uniformity comes from
at least three different sources. First, seeking uniformity and transparency in
program administration is a longstanding progressive strategy for
combating racial discrimination. Recent research suggests that
discrimination remains a serious problem in public benefit programs. 157
King v. Smith probably rejected Alabama's policy of denying AFDC to
women with frequent male guests in part because of suspicions that it was
being applied disproportionately against women of color.158 Similarly, the
rationality required for state agencies to prevail at fair hearings under
Goldberg v. Kelly offered some defense against racially biased program
administration from a Court that was soon to demonstrate an unwillingness
to do more. 159 Second, conservatives have sought uniformity in applying
work and other behavioral requirements because of suspicions that
eligibility workers would exempt many claimants if empowered to do so. 160
Finally, management concerns over improving the accuracy with which
155. The most striking example of this is 42 U.S.C. § 617, added by PRWORA, which
prohibits HHS from regulating states' conduct of their TANF programs without express statutory
authority.
156. In tacit recognition of this fact, the Food and Nutrition Service has posted its Manual
310, the Food Stamp Program Quality Control Review Handbook, on its website. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP PROGRAM QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW
HANDBOOK (2003), http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/qc/pdfs/3 10_Handbook_2003.pdf.
157. See, e.g., Gooden, supra note 76 (finding that black welfare recipients receive less
transportation and education aid than white recipients).
158. See DOROTHY K. NEWMAN ET AL., PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY: BLACK
AMERICANS AND WHITE INSTITUTIONS, 1940-75, at 260 (1978).
159. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (rejecting, for failure to show
discriminatory intent, an equal protection challenge to lower benefit levels provided to categories
of public recipients that were predominantly black and Hispanic than to categories primarily
serving low-income whites).
160. See RECTOR, supra note 78, at 5-6.
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eligibility workers execute policy increases the pressure for uniformity.
Although most visible in the food stamp quality control (QC) system, this
phenomenon operates much more widely. 161
As a result, on many important subjects, state agencies do not make
formal policy at all. Where policy is to be made, it often is through the
programming of automated systems that are assumed to be less prone than
humans to bias, sentiment, interpretation, or error.
Paradoxically, the importance of states' rules also is eroded by the
increase in the sheer number of rules. Eligibility workers, supervisors, and
even many state administrators cannot possibly remain conversant with all
of the contents of their multivolume policy manuals. In many agencies,
caseloads deny eligibility workers the opportunity to look up and analyze
the rules applicable to each problem they encounter. In addition, many
agencies have such high rates of turnover that they must limit the amount of
time they invest in training eligibility workers.' 62 As a result, eligibility
workers may not even have heard of the formal policy applicable to many
problems. Instead, eligibility workers will familiarize themselves with a
few areas of policy they believe are most important, either because of
recurrent problems or because of superiors' apparent priorities.
Eligibility workers, of course, do not reanalyze every problem de novo.
Although not charting their courses on the basis of rules or applying
anything resembling stare decisis, most will naturally tend to reach similar
conclusions when confronted with similar facts. Workers who have not
encountered a particular problem before will consult more experienced
peers. The result is a method of elaborating policy that resembles a
common law process of reasoning from case to case far more than a
rule-based system.163 This means that merely changing a program's rules is
unlikely to change its operation on the local level. Assumptions that
positive law more or less dictates agencies' operational behavior are
plausible only where the private entities with which they interact know the
positive law and have the resources to enforce it if necessary. The vast
majority of claimants for public benefits neither know their rights under
agency rules nor have the means to enforce them. Indeed, most claimants'
primary sources of information about agencies' rules are eligibility workers
161. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1202-06.
162. If tax preparation firms and similar businesses are paying several thousands of dollars a
year more than the welfare department for less demanding work, the agency cannot expect to
retain eligibility workers for long. The higher the turnover an agency has, the higher the total
number of weeks of productive work it loses while training new eligibility workers. If a typical
worker will only stay a year, training new workers for three months each means that about one
quarter of the agency's workforce will be in training at any given time. A logical response might
be to adopt more competitive pay levels, but that often is beyond agency executives' power.
163. Put another way, the system operates on the strength of orders far more than rules. See
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969) (plurality opinion) (allowing an agency
to act through orders rather than by promulgating rules).
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and other claimants, both of whom are likely to reflect the "common law"
of practice in other claimants' cases far more directly than they do the
agencies' written policies.
The inability of eligibility workers and lower-level supervisors to keep
track of, much less comply with, an agency's plethora of rules and
directives offers new opportunities to shield potentially controversial
policies from political scrutiny. Faced with demands for two operationally
incompatible policies-such as stringent work requirements covering the
overwhelming majority of the caseload and protections for all those who
would be likely to suffer severe hardship-state officials can promulgate
rules that implement both policies and then rely on informal signaling
methods to communicate to line employees which of the two they will
enforce more stringently. Few researchers, journalists, or even advocates
will look beyond a formally satisfactory policy to see if it is being
overridden in practice by another. Under this approach, discretion lies not
on the face of the rules but in the choice of which rules to follow.
Oddly enough, then, as policymakers increasingly reject the premises of
the rule-based system, they are demolishing it as much by producing an
overload of new rules as by repealing old ones. Thus, any attempt to
separate law from practice in the public benefits context is hopeless folly.
In this atmosphere, practices that induce real or apparent choices not to
participate in public benefit programs can flourish with little legal or policy
scrutiny.
2. The Limitations of Fair Hearings as Responses to Choice-Based
Rationing Techniques
Another cornerstone of legal advocacy in the pre-1996 public benefits
system was the administrative fair hearing. Some scholars overestimate the
importance of the fair hearing.164 Long before public benefit programs'
structure began to change in the 1990s, fair hearings had been marginalized
in most states' program administration. The best, and often the only,
national data are from the food stamp program. Food stamp rules provide
more specific standards for eligibility and state agencies' behavior than the
rules of any other state-administered public benefit program. Thus, one
might expect the fair hearing process to offer claimants more leverage in
164. See, e.g., David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 231 (1998); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The End of Welfare and Constitutional Protections
for the Poor: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Works Program and Due Process Rights, 13
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 153 (1998); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights:
The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM.
U. L. REv. 1111 (1996).
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the food stamp program than in other programs granting states greater
discretion. 165
Although New York is a significant outlier,166 in most states the
overwhelming majority of claimants who requested and pursued fair
hearings received nothing for their efforts. 167 Perhaps even more
significantly, extremely few claimants even request fair hearings. Given
that the number of fair hearings held in a year equals only 0.5% of the
average monthly number of families receiving food stamps, 168 such
hearings seem unlikely to have a major influence on programs' operations.
Even an eligibility worker with the relatively high caseload of two hundred
households is likely to be asked to attend a fair hearing only once a year
and may lose one only once every three years. Since no adverse
consequences generally attach to an eligibility worker for losing a hearing,
this process can hardly bear much of a deterrent effect.
As weak as the fair hearing system was under the old regime, however,
the shift to choice-based rationing reduces its efficacy even further. Where
the claimant's "choice" not to receive a benefit resulted from her not
knowing that the benefit was available, she is also unlikely to know about
fair hearings or about any issue she might raise at one. Similarly, where the
claimant knows about the benefit but does not understand how to obtain it,
she may not know how to request a fair hearing.
Even if a hearing is held, the state's role in events leading to the
claimant's failure to receive the benefit may be relatively invisible and
hence difficult to criticize under the program's rules. On the other hand, the
claimant will have to struggle to show that her actions or inactions did not
either disqualify her from receiving the benefit or waive or forfeit her rights
to that benefit. 169 At best, the hearing may be reduced to a credibility
165. In addition, states report that 3.57% of the denials and terminations they examined as
part of the food stamp quality control system were erroneous. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD
STAMP PROGRAM QUALITY CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 19 (2000).
Moreover, underissuances to food stamp recipients equal 2.4% of the total value of all benefits
issued. Id. at 15. Thus, many food stamp claimants appear to have valid claims that would allow
them to prevail at hearings.
166. Anecdotal evidence suggests that claimants' relative success in fair hearings in New
York, particularly in New York City, derives from the habit of many eligibility workers not to
take the time required to travel to the site where hearings are held. Thus, agency staffs' aversion to
dealing with their own bureaucracy causes many claimants to win by default.
167. See STATE ADMIN. BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP PROGRAM STATE
ACTIVITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 22 (2002).
168. Id. at 6, 22.
169. The distinction between waiver and forfeiture-between affirmatively surrendering a
right and simply failing to assert it-is very important in criminal procedure. See, e.g., United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (distinguishing between objections passively forfeited,
which are subject to review but only under the deferential "plain error" standard, and affirmatively
waived rights, which may not form the basis of an appeal at all). Waivers of important rights must
be "knowing and voluntary," which requires the individual being held to the waiver to be aware
not just of the waiver but also of the relevant facts and of the waiver's likely consequences. Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 556-57 (2d Cir.
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determination about whether something the eligibility worker said was a
suggestion or a mandate; these sorts of credibility determinations tend to go
badly for claimants.
3. The Demise of Public Benefits Litigation
The mainstay of liberal policy change in public benefit programs in the
three decades preceding PRWORA was the affirmative class action lawsuit.
Litigation requires an injured claimant who seeks legal help, an attorney
willing to bring the case, the absence of a lethal procedural defense, and a
claim with substantive merit. Each of these conditions can be a significant
obstacle to litigation challenging post-1 996 choice-based rationing.
The basis on which a claimant is denied benefits is likely to have a
strong influence on whether she or he seeks advocacy help. Behavioral
requirements are among the most likely to be understood by, and to offend,
the claimants they disadvantage. When an eligibility worker tells a claimant
that she is ineligible because of some specific action or omission, she often
will feel either that the eligibility worker got his facts wrong or that the
requirement is unfair. By contrast, programs' financial formulae and
procedural requirements often are relatively opaque to claimants. Without
the formula the agency applied, the data about her circumstances that the
agency relied upon, and a fair amount of mathematical sophistication and
confidence, claimants cannot evaluate financial eligibility determinations
independently. Similarly, without a clear notion of what was required,
many claimants may fear looking foolish challenging an assertion that they
defaulted on their procedural obligations. At most, they may complain that
they were unaware of those rules at the relevant time, an argument that
rarely prevails. 17 0
As a result, claimants are far more likely to complain to potential legal
representatives about behavioral eligibility restrictions than financial or
procedural ones. Thus, an agency relying on sanctions for noncompliance
with behavior requirements is relatively likely to attract advocacy
intervention, while one that rations benefits informally with procedural
obstacles is not. Unsuccessful claimants might not approach legal services
1996). Although claimants deterred from receiving public benefits through informal rationing
often will not meet the standard for knowing and voluntary waivers of rights, programs generally
require claimants to submit an application for benefits. A claimant who did not apply is not
eligible for benefits, regardless of why she did not do so. This, then, is effectively a forfeiture.
Similarly, because claimants for public benefits generally bear the burden of proof in establishing
eligibility, those who fail to perform all of the tasks the program's rules require generally are
treated as having forfeited their rights to those benefits without regard to whether they met the
standards for knowing and voluntary waiver.
170. See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1985) (holding that food stamp
recipients have no constitutional right to notice of a change in federal law prior to the reduction in
their food stamps).
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programs and similar agencies when denied benefits on procedural grounds
because they might assume the problem is insoluble.
This would seem to suggest that states building informal rationing
systems around behavioral requirements might be opening themselves
increasingly to litigation. This might well have been true but for three key
changes. First, the elimination of the entitlement to cash assistance in the
Social Security Act and many state laws was widely understood as a
rejection of public benefits litigation. To the extent that judges share that
understanding, they may be particularly eager to find procedural or
substantive grounds to dismiss claimants' cases. Moreover, to the extent
that states can change their rules and practices more rapidly and
inexpensively than claimants can challenge those rules and practices, the
rewards for winning a challenge against an unlawful policy are greatly
reduced.
Second, prior to enacting PRWORA the 104th Congress sharply
reduced legal services funding and restricted the remaining legal services
advocates' ability to advocate on issues relating to "welfare reform."'
' 71
Third, new behavioral conditions have been implemented in tandem
with other changes in tone and procedure that have confused many
claimants and discouraged them from investigating possible legal rights. If
one believes one is unlikely to have any enforceable legal rights, one is less
likely to take the time to go to a legal services office. Also, if one believes
one's receipt of public benefits would be brief or costly in any event, one
has less incentive to question whether one is getting somewhat fewer
months than might otherwise be allowed. Finally, if one believes that one's
eligibility worker holds virtually absolute control over one's ability to
receive desperately needed public benefits, one may be reluctant to risk
alienating her or him by attempting to file what appears to be a futile
lawsuit.
Even assuming claimants seek out attorneys to file litigation
challenging a choice-based rationing technique, the probabilistic impact of
those techniques17 2 is likely to pose difficult analytical problems to courts,
forcing them to adopt a very new role. The traditional role of the court in
public benefits law has been to interpret formal rules: The statute or
regulation speaks, and the court ensures that the administering agency
obeys. The claimant is eligible, or she is not. The rules of standing reinforce
this mechanistic vision of law: The Supreme Court has taken a dim view of
cases brought on probabilistic theories. The fact that a given policy makes it
more likely that a hospital will turn away a low-income patient 173 or that a
171. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
172. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
173. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
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police officer will injure a suspectI74 is insufficient to create a cognizable
case or controversy. 175 Thus, cases asking courts to determine that a
particular policy reduced, while not eliminating, the likelihood that
concededly eligible claimants would receive benefits calls on courts to
depart significantly from their traditional and accepted roles.
The difficulty of litigating these policies may mean that no advocacy is
done at all. Lawyers' habit of analyzing problems in terms of their litigation
potential may cause them unconsciously to adopt the mechanistic outlook
of the standing rules. This can cause them to miss numerous problems that
indisputably make a difference in practice. A regime of employee
evaluation that increases by half the likelihood that a claimant's application
will be denied may not be actionable, 76 but it reduces the number of claims
that will be allowed just as reliably as tightening financial eligibility limits
would.
4. The Decline of the Attorney-Client Relationship as the Paradigm
for Public Benefits Advocacy
Rightly or wrongly, scholars and lawyers conventionally tended to
chart change in AFDC in terms of litigation around formal eligibility
requirements. 77 The process thus could be understood in terms of an
adversary process built upon a more or less traditional attorney-client
relationship.
PRWORA's elimination of most federal rights to family cash assistance
obviously has extinguished most such litigation. Yet even in Medicaid, food
stamps, and other means-tested programs where claimants retain more
substantial federal statutory rights, litigation has declined sharply. The
fading of litigation has resulted in part from Congress's action in 1995 to
incapacitate federally funded legal services programs from bringing class
actions and lawsuits challenging the vaguely defined concept of "welfare
reform" or receiving attorneys' fees to sustain their work. 78 As Congress
174. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983).
175. Similarly, many conditions that make a decisionmaker much more or less likely to rule
in a particular manner generally do not suffice to establish a cognizable claim of bias under the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975) (rejecting a per se rule
that a board that initiates an investigation may not adjudicate the results). Accordingly, lawyers do
not tend to "spot" these issues, as real as they may be in practice.
176. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting
challenges to a review procedure that subjected Social Security administrative law judges with
high rates of allowances to more intensive scrutiny), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
177. This author believes that, even with respect to AFDC, this approach is problematic. See
David A. Super, Entitlement, Counter-Entitlement, and Disentitlement: The Substantive
Importance of Programmatic Structure (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
178. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3, 1612.3,
1617.3, 1626.3, 1639.3, 1642.3 (2003). The Supreme Court struck down the restriction on legal
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cut and restricted legal services programs' funding, other organizations and
funders perceived a gap and sought to step in. Many of these advocates
were not lawyers and did not see the need to intervene through litigation.
The shift away from litigation also resulted in part from changes in
what are the most important issues in these programs. With the Supreme
Court's emphatic rejection of constitutional claims to welfare benefits in the
early 1970s,1 79 it became clear that federal or state legislatures were the
only potential entities that would liberalize basic eligibility rules,
particularly numeric rules such as income and resource eligibility levels. To
be sure, litigation to enforce compliance with existing standards of
performance has been important.18° No longer, however, is it the exclusive
or even primary vehicle for enforcing those standards.' 
8
'
In addition, the dominance of litigation in the three decades prior to
PRWORA can be traced in significant part to the default of other means of
change. Through much of that period, the political process was hopelessly
deadlocked on major public benefits issues, particularly those surrounding
AFDC. Thus, litigation results that much of the public, or even majorities in
Congress, likely would have rejected could stand for many years because
significant welfare legislation could not move. With the passage of
PRWORA, this obstruction in the political process was decisively broken. It
no longer serves any great purpose for lawyers to devise clever
reinterpretations of statutes or regulations if Congress or a state legislature
is likely to pass a "technical correction" of the language in question before
the case even goes to judgment. Thus, to have much value a litigation
theory must be sustainable both legally and politically, with the standard of
review on the latter criterion now markedly more stringent.
The rise in informal, choice-based rationing further reduced the
importance of litigation as a means of expanding public benefit programs.
Many of these policies, though debatable on policy grounds, are fairly
services' participation in matters involving "welfare reform." Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2001). Nonetheless, the tools that LSC-funded advocates can use to influence the
policies of state public benefit programs remain extremely limited.
179. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1972) (upholding state grant
levels that were lower for families with children than for aged, blind, and disabled persons against
a challenge noting that recipients of welfare were far more likely to be people of color);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that classifications in welfare programs
ordinarily need only pass a "reasonable basis" standard of review).
180. See, e.g., Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992) (untimely processing of
food stamp applications); Alexander v. Hill, 707 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1983) (untimely processing of
Medicaid applications); Southside Welfare Rights Org. v. Stangler, 156 F.R.D. 187 (W.D.
Mo. 1993) (untimely processing of food stamp applications); Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (same).
181. See, e.g., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NEW YORK PROGRAM
ACCESS REVIEW NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1998 (1999) (requiring correction of many of the same
kinds of violations of applicants' rights that have prompted litigation in prior years).
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plainly legal. Even where a legal question exists,182 only rarely will an
attorney willing and able to file such a case encounter an individual who
has a claim that can survive the many procedural defenses available to
program administrators.' 83 Any case that survives these procedural hurdles
may founder on the difficulty of proving the extent of the alleged practice,
establishing that it really did prevent claimants from obtaining benefits,
and demonstrating that claimants did not waive or abandon their claims at
some point.
Several important consequences flow from this partial replacement of
the traditional attorney-client model of pursuing change in public benefits
law. First, and most obviously, transporting these debates from the
courtroom to legislative chambers or agencies' conference rooms changes
the nature of the evidence and arguments that may be brought to bear.
However artificial it may have been to try to separate public benefits law
from public benefits policy prior to 1996, today it is simply absurd. An
advocate who is not fluent in the language of incentives will accomplish
little.
Second, the process of accommodating multiple interests becomes
much more complex. This is particularly important because informal
rationing often has divergent impacts on various groups of claimants. In
litigation, ethical rules prevent any one attorney from representing multiple
parties with adverse interests. When more affluent interest groups engage
lobbyists, they observe similar principles: No one who can afford to choose
is likely to want a lobbyist who is working for competing interests. By
contrast, only one or a small handful of groups is likely to be advocating the
liberalization of a program before Congress or federal administrators, or on
the state level. When an adversity arises between the interests of various
subpopulations of claimants, these advocates must resolve them internally.
They must decide, for example, whether to increase the chances that a given
liberalization will be adopted by agreeing to exempt an unpopular group of
182. For example, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(2) requires a food stamp office not just to allow
potential claimants to apply but requires it to "encourage" them to do so if they express an interest
in receiving food stamps or concerns about having sufficient food. This could give discouraged
potential applicants a legal claim even if they cannot show that they actually have been prohibited
from applying.
183. For example, if the individual has not yet been denied benefits, she or he is unlikely to
have standing. Cf cases cited supra notes 173-174. If she or he has been denied benefits in the
past but does not have a claim for benefits for the current period, the Eleventh Amendment may
prevent the claimant from invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68-73 (1985). Counsel will have an ethical duty to seek to overcome the procedural
barriers keeping the prospective plaintiff from receiving benefits; upon doing so, she or he may
either lack standing or, if the case already has been filed, be vulnerable to dismissal for mootness.
Alternatively, upon receipt of a demand letter or the filing of the suit, the defendants may choose
to provide benefits to the claimant to create standing or mootness problems. These obstacles to
decisions on the merits are far less likely in litigation over an explicit eligibility rule that
defendants assert is valid.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 1 13: 815
Offering an Invisible Hand
claimants. If a limited fund is set aside for liberalization in a program, these
advocates must decide how to seek to have it spent. Thus, although the
process by which these groups interact with their opponents is very much
adversarial, 184 the process by which they resolve competing interests within
the claimant population does not conform to traditional models of the
attorney-client relationship. This phenomenon has become increasingly
significant as debates about public benefits policy have been characterized
more frequently by attempts to differentiate between the "worthy" and
"unworthy" poor through purported tests of desire and willingness to "earn"
benefits. 185 Indeed, conflicts can arise over whether to advocate formal or
informal rationing. Some advocacy groups may prefer a more stringent
regime of informal rationing to reductions in eligibility, because the former
may seem more readily reversible in the future-or a less obvious sign of
defeat to the groups' funders or other constituents.
Finally, the partial abrogation of the attorney-client model for advocacy
on behalf of the claimants' interests for public benefits has led to critical
information issues. In conventional attorney-client relationships, the
attorney learns of the client's needs, desires, and problems primarily from
the client. 186 The new, nonattorney advocacy groups that lack relationships
with clients must develop alternative ways of understanding how programs
affect claimants. The complexity and frequent invisibility of informal
rationing makes this particularly crucial. Although desirable, simply talking
to actual claimants is no solution either. These advocates obviously cannot
talk to all or even a significant fraction of claimants and potential claimants
for these benefits. They inevitably must consider how well the views and
problems of the claimants they meet represent those of others.,87 Thus,
qualitative and quantitative social science research becomes increasingly
184. A naive model of consensus policymaking, in which public-spirited individuals try to
balance all competing interests, clearly would not capture the process. All participants in these
debates conceive of themselves as part of an adversarial process. Groups supporting or opposing
programs talk of one another as opponents, they respond to one another's writings, and they view
results as victories or defeats depending on the degree to which a program is strengthened or
weakened.
185. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 5, at 274-77; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 5, at 80-82;
McDonald & Diehl, supra note 117, at 1037; Williams, supra note 117, at 1195-97.
186. This phenomenon has a limited parallel in attorneys' representation of mentally
incompetent clients. See, e.g., Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client:
What the Model Rules Say and Don't Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 241 (1998). Although this
can be an issue in class action litigation, including that surrounding public benefit programs, there
it is governed by somewhat more formalized principles. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Client-
Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest
Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining,
Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
187. This is a particularly serious problem in connection with claimants and potential
claimants whose ability to contact social welfare advocacy groups is limited by disability or work
schedules.
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crucial in shaping the direction of advocacy efforts. Yet research may be
more valuable in executing a predetermined strategy rather than in
identifying a problem in the first place.
B. Advocacy in the New Public Benefits Environment
The great liberal dream of the 1960s-that somehow, with the right
legal theory and the right court, the law could become a great engine of
social reform rolling over the political process on behalf of low-income
people' 88-- clearly has ceased to be credible. The myth that the law could so
dominate the political process endured as long as it did because the political
process spent so much of the three decades prior to PRWORA in near
paralysis. With much more of public benefits policy now being addressed
within the political domain, the role of the law must inevitably shrink.
On the other hand, the contrary conclusion-that law has become
irrelevant to social welfare law-is also indefensible. Effective legal
advocacy can achieve favorable results on the plethora of issues too
complex or too vexing to gain broad public attention. Even if one supposes,
for example, that the public supported a block grant mechanism for
expanding children's health insurance coverage, it surely did not have any
notion of how that block grant should interact with the existing Medicaid
program. Foresighted legal advocacy established the screen-and-enroll
requirement and antisupplanting rules that preserved Medicaid's vitality., 89
Similarly, even if one believes that the public supports calibrating food
stamp benefits by need-or, more probably, supports a funding level that
makes such calibration necessary-it cannot have any meaningful
preferences as to whether horizontal and temporal targeting requires greater
precision.'90
Law also sets many of the incentives that drive agencies' behavior.
Some states, local offices, and eligibility workers will defy these incentives
out of passion or thoughtlessness. Perfect compliance, however, is not a
realistic standard. Even in an era when explicit mandates were far more
common, numerous violations went unnoticed or unlitigated by advocates
or were insufficiently striking to prompt judicial intervention.' 91 A
188. See, e.g., MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 119-45 (1993) (describing efforts to design a systematic welfare
litigation strategy relying on legal services lawyers); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 87,
at 301-69 (describing the close links between the welfare rights and legal services movements in
the late 1960s and early 1970s).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc(b)(2) (2000) (preventing states from using SCHIP block grant
funds to supplant their healthcare costs for their own employees).
190. See Super, supra note 64 (manuscript at 30-31).
191. But see Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring full, not
merely substantial, compliance with federal regulations on timeliness).
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thoughtful system of incentives, designed with a subtle understanding of
states' choices and constraints, can affect behavior as well as most
mandates. Just as the law of contract has produced a viable system of
incentives without judges frequently invoking specific performance, so too
a careful application of the law can shape much of the most important
behavior in public benefit programs.
In addition, law is the starting point for the complex patterns of
signaling that direct states' and local offices' operations of a program.
Eligibility workers do not read statutes and may not even have routine
access to regulations. Yet those regulations provide the basis for data fields,
refresher trainings, performance reviews, and other signs of higher
agencies' priorities.' 92 HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) and the USDA conducted reviews of access to Medicaid and food
stamps in 1999 and 2000 not so much to obtain specific answers as to signal
with their questions the importance of those issues. 193 States' compliance
with federal rules protecting claimants' access to food stamps is far from
immaculate. Yet most states likely would have continued to adhere to many
of those procedures for some years even if those rules had been repealed, as
the USDA proposed in 2000. Nonetheless, the decision of the USDA's
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) 194 to preserve and expand claimants'
rights sent states a powerful message that access deserved more weight in
their decisionmaking.
Finally, after securing a system of incentives and signals that channels
most states' behavior in desirable directions, the law provides a valuable
means for bringing the few remaining deviant states into line. The courts
cannot force fifty states and innumerable local offices to change, and they
are unlikely to try. They can, however, bring an occasional outlier into
line.19
5
192. Statutes and regulations should be designed with an understanding that they will have to
be translated in this manner to have a significant effect. Legal principles that are excessively
complex, or that require information not readily available to states' eligibility workers and
automated systems, are likely to become garbled in application no matter how the original statute
or regulation was drafted.
193. See Super, supra note 64 (manuscript at 53); Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland,
Director of the Center for Medical Assistance, Health Care Financing Administration, to State
Medicaid Directors (Apr. 7, 2000), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd407OO.asp.
194. FNS is the agency within the USDA charged with operating the food stamp program.
7 C.F.R. § 271.3 (2003).
195. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (imposing
extensive remedies for New York City's interference with low-income claimants' ability to apply
for food stamps and Medicaid).
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1. A Nonadversarial Alternative to Fair Hearings
Whatever the weaknesses of the actual fair hearing system, the
concerns that gave rise to administrative review procedures even before
Goldberg remain valid. Indeed, the decreased visibility of agencies' actions
to influence claimants' decisions may make external review even more
important.
It therefore is worth examining the fair hearing process to find what
elements can be salvaged in a reconstituted form of external review. The
aspect of the fair hearing system that has failed most conspicuously is its
reliance on an adversarial process. Claimants do not request the hearings
when they have been mistreated, and they generally flounder when they do
get to a hearing. Many of the same benefits could be obtained, however, by
trying to replicate as much of the fair hearing, as possible through an
inquisitorial rather than adversarial system.
One example is the customer service reviews the Tennessee
Department of Human Services has established for cases prior to closure. 196
Except where the basis for closure is financial eligibility-one of the
remaining objective formal eligibility rules-all cases must be sent to
impartial experts for review. Where the case file does not support the
eligibility worker's proposed action, the termination is disallowed and the
file is returned for further work. Where the basis of closure is failure to
comply with a behavioral requirement, the customer service reviewer tries
to contact the claimant to try to induce compliance. Since Tennessee
established this system, customer service reviewers have been able to reach
about half of all recipients proposed for termination and have been able to
achieve compliance-avoiding a termination-for two-thirds of them. File
reviews also have resulted in vacating one-third of all terminations in cases
where reviewers did not reach the claimant.' 
97
This overall success rate of about fifty percent towers over the
achievements of the fair hearing system. It does not require initiation by the
recipient family, representation, or eligibility workers to take time out of
their days to attend hearings. The customer service reviewers have access
to, and can become expert in, the full range of the agency's policies,
including those that are embedded in automated systems or otherwise
unavailable to claimants or even most advocates. This system also allows
196. See Russ Overby, Tenn. Justice Ctr., Customer Service Review: Tennessee's Review
Process Before Welfare Reform Cases Are Closed, http://www.tnjustice.org/Links/Customer.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
197. These results are compiled from weekly reports of the Tennessee Department of Human
Services on welfare case closures, covering the period of January 2002 to October 2003. See, e.g.,
Office of Research & Pub. Serv., Coll. of Soc. Work, Tennessee Department of Human Services:
Customer Service Review Weekly Report 3 (Oct. 17, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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for a new category of successful outcomes: cases in which the eligibility
worker's actions technically were valid but where offering accommodations
can achieve compliance. These accommodations can be as simple as a
clearer explanation of the requirement and a second chance to comply. This
latter possibility provides a basis for promoting this approach in the new
regime of public benefits law: The reviewers' intervention can improve the
quality of claimants' choices.
Although no other state has fully emulated Tennessee's system,
simpler, if less effective, means exist for achieving independent
nonadversarial reviews of eligibility workers' decisions. The food stamp
quality control system long has required states to review a sample of the
cases they deny or terminate198 and to implement corrective action for
significant deficiencies.1 99 In 2000, the USDA required its regional offices
to review a subsample of the cases states examined in these "negative
action reviews."
A standard due process lawsuit in the Goldberg mold is unlikely to
result in a requirement that states institute customer service reviews
or similar mechanisms. On the other hand, states may find such devices
help them meet other goals or obligations, such as the accommodation
of persons with disabilities. 20 0 The establishment of these reviews also
might be a mutually advantageous way of settling a more traditional due
process case.2 °1
2. Managing Program Administrators'Incentives
If incentives rather than mandates are becoming the primary language
for influencing claimants' participation in public benefit programs, the
same is increasingly true for influencing the practices of state and local
administrative agencies. Advocates of more relaxed informal rationing
regimes therefore must understand what motivates state administrators and
the staffs of local offices if they are to have any hope of change.
Fortunately, in several key areas the interests of administrators and
claimants coincide.2 °2 First, both struggle with information costs: The more
198. 7 C.F.R. § 275.13.
199. Id. § 275.16(b)(3).
200. See Cary LaCheen, Using Title 1I of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Behalf of
Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 (2001).
201. See, e.g., Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 474-75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 923 (2002) (finding that, notwithstanding language in federal and state statutes
disavowing any entitlement to cash assistance, the state's eligibility rules were sufficiently
objective to create a property interest in continued benefits). In other words, even if a court might
be more inclined to order a traditional fair hearing structure, both parties might find that a
nonadversarial customer service review structure served their interests better.
202. This discussion focuses primarily on state administrators because they more frequently
can control their agencies' positions in national policy debates. Many of the same considerations
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information and verification administrators are required to obtain from
claimants, the more burdensome the process becomes for both and the
greater the risk of errors for each. Thus, Medicaid and food stamp options
to reduce information demands on claimants proved hugely popular among
states. Were it not for the strong political desire to reduce cash assistance
roles without adopting formally restrictive eligibility policies, state
administrators likely would disdain many parts of states' informal rationing
regimes for cash assistance benefits.
Second, both generally prefer systems that work and become frustrated
when they do not.203 Claimants learn about public benefit programs
significantly from their own experiences and those of friends and relatives.
A broken, erratically performing system will be harder to understand and
predict through these means. New eligibility workers learn policy from one
another; a chaotic system in which eligibility workers simultaneously
pursue several inconsistent policies will be far more difficult for new
workers to decipher.
Third, and related, simplicity generally benefits both claimants and
administrators. The channels that both claimants and eligibility workers rely
upon to learn about programs' rules are ill-equipped to convey intricacies.
The value of any special rule-a benefit tailored to address an unusual
need, an exception to a burdensome requirement, or the like-must be
discounted for the substantial number of potential beneficiaries who will
not learn about or understand it and for those whose eligibility workers will
fail to implement it properly. Some complexities, to be sure, are worth it:
for example, the medically needy eligibility category that makes major
surgery available to some uninsured people above Medicaid's regular
motivate federal civil servants as well, but political appointees more routinely override their
preferences in adopting administration policy.
203. Whatever the merits of the 1960s welfare rights strategy to provoke a crisis of public
welfare administration, see PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 87, at 264-362, broken systems today
clearly do not lead to anything positive for claimants. The political process is not about to respond
to any such failures with new infusions of resources, much less federalization of programs, see id.,
and claimants tend to be the first victims of chaotic or inept administration. For example, during
the mid-I 980s, Pennsylvania both abandoned expedited issuance of food stamps and ran up one of
the highest QC error rates in the country. See Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266, 270-73 (E.D. Pa.
1986); STATISTICAL SUPPORT SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP QUALITY CONTROL
ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 12-13 (1988). Over the last several years, California has
had both one of the lowest participation rates and a persistently high error rate. ALLEN L. SCHIRM
& LAURA A. CASTNER, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REACHING THOSE N NEED: STATE FOOD STAMP
PARTICIPATION RATES IN 2000, at 2 (2002), http://www.fns.usda.gov/oaneiMENU/Published/
FSP/FILES/Participation/Reaching2000.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 165, at 13. New
York in the late 1990s managed both to raise numerous unlawful access barriers to eligible
households and to maintain an extremely high QC error rate. See Reynolds v. Giuliani,
35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 165, at 13.
Georgia and Michigan had high error rates throughout the 1990s and proceeded to blame
the overissuances on claimant fraud. The result was thousands of disqualifications without
hearings. See STATE ADMIN. BRANCH, supra note 167, at 24, 26; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra
note 165, at 13.
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income guidelines, or the food stamp shelter deduction that mitigates the
choice between heating and eating that many low-income people face.2 °4
Conversely, because the participation effects of simplification are difficult
to quantify, budget analysts likely underestimate the benefit of the kinds of
changes made in Medicaid and food stamps in the years following
PRWORA. Whatever state administrators' personal ideological preferences
may be, their self-interest is likely to drive them to support simple policies
and oppose confusing and error-prone ones.20 5 Thus, many types of
informal rationing systems may appeal to senior policymakers much more
than they appeal to program managers.
Finally, program administrators and the vast majority of claimants
share an interest in developing other, better sources of income for the
claimants. For the administrators, this has emerged in the post-PRWORA
world as a significant criterion upon which their success is measured.2 °6 For
claimants, it represents the reality that public benefits provide grossly
inadequate resources to support a family and are dispensed in a manner that
offers little security. 2°7 To be sure, administrators and claimants often have
very different ideas about how the goal of employment should be pursued:
Few claimants presumably favor sanctions for violating work requirements
or policies that increase the effective cost of receiving assistance.
Nonetheless, this commonality of purpose can provide the basis for
advocacy strategies, including many of those that helped transform
Medicaid and the food stamp program over the last several years.
In other respects, to be sure, state administrators' interests are distinctly
their own. Even here, however, these interests generally are not antithetical
to those of claimants and thus provide leverage to advance claimants'
positions. First, because the quality of their performance is so difficult to
measure, administrators are extremely sensitive to systems of rewards and
204. See DOROTHY ROSENBAUM ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE FOOD
STAMP SHELTER DEDUCTION: HELPING HOUSEHOLDS WITH HIGH HOUSING BURDENS MEET
THEIR FOOD NEEDS 1-2 (2002).
205. Just as John Kenneth Galbraith noted that the foremost objective of corporate managers
is to ensure a sufficient level of return to maintain their autonomy, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 166-71 (1967), so too human services managers' prime objective
must be to avoid criticism that could threaten their tenure. Complex rules that administrators'
staffs may fail to implement correctly pose a much greater risk of critical evaluations. Except on
those rare occasions when political passions are most inflamed, ideological missteps or even
unanticipated spending do not pose similar risks. Just as "[lIoss can destroy the technostructure;
high revenues accrue to others," id. at 168 (footnote omitted), accusations of mismanagement can
lead to the decapitation and dismemberment of an agency; credit for achieving ideological purity
will be seized by political superiors.
206. House-passed legislation reauthorizing the TANF block grant would offer states bonuses
on top of their block grants if they achieved substantial improvements in the employment status of
former welfare recipients. Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003,
H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 105 (2003).
207. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 77 (finding an overwhelming preference for work
among single mothers receiving cash assistance).
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penalties even if very modest amounts of money are at stake. Thus, in the
2002 food stamp reauthorization bill, state administrators favored the
financially less advantageous House version of QC sanction reform because
the Senate bill contained a procedure for branding states "seriously
negligent."20 8 Conversely, when CMS and claimants' advocacy groups
circulated scorecards of the simplicity of states' Medicaid enrollment
processes, many states appeared to respond in hopes of improving their
grades.209
Second, state administrators do not necessarily seek to maximize
revenues or minimize outlays. Although human services agencies have
budgets, experienced state administrators recognize that factors beyond
their control-small economic changes, modest natural disasters, and the
like-can affect their ability to meet those budgets more than their policy
decisions do. Thus, CMS's $500 million fund at a generous match and the
several million dollars FNS made available without a state match could not
induce many states to make delinking a priority or to create work slots for
claimants reaching the food stamp time limit.210 Their budgets already were
flush and they had other priorities. Conversely, the cost of expanding
Medicaid rolls did not seem to disturb state administrators until the recent
state budget crises because the administrators were focused on the nonfiscal
goal of reducing the incidence of uninsuredness. Yet monetary incentives
can have some effects. Creating a dedicated funding stream for a particular
entity within a state government can help empower that entity to set its own
course: FNS did this by giving antifraud units thirty-five percent of the
value of food stamps they can get designated as trafficked. 211 Funds
sufficient to provide substantial incentives can be difficult to obtain, but not
impossible to provide.
Third, state administrators tend to value stability. Continuity is much
easier to manage than change and creates far less risk of embarrassing
misfires. Change forces administrators to expend capital within their
agencies to obtain scarce resources such as the time of computer
programmers, policywriters, and staff trainers. Unless the benefits of a new
policy clearly outweigh those costs and risks, state administrators are likely
to be leery. Thus, absent acute distress, most administrators tend to prefer a
bad familiar policy to a new, better one. This certainly was evident in
states' resistance to delinking Medicaid from cash assistance, as well as the
208. Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001, S. 1731, 107th Cong.
§ 430 (2002).
209. See DONNA COHEN Ross & LAURA COX, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
MAKING IT SIMPLE: MEDICAID FOR CHILDREN AND CHIP INCOME ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES AND
ENROLLMENT PROCEDURES: FINDINGS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY, at v, 22-34 (2000) (listing
states that have not adopted specified Medicaid simplification options).
210. See Super, supra note 64 (manuscript at 42-43).
211. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.18(a) (2003).
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low take-up rate of a transitional food stamp option for recipients leaving
TANF, 12 despite states' expressed philosophical support for the concept.
213
State administrators tend to be suspicious of ideologues, who demand rapid
change without considering the bureaucratic costs, who tend to be impatient
with logistical obstacles to achieving that change, and whose policies may
be unacceptable to their successors, leading to further demands for change.
At times when advocates are seeking radical changes in states' programs,
this administrative conservatism has been intensely frustrating. Certainly it
has caused successful plaintiffs in public benefits litigation great frustration
as they have sought rapid implementation of their judgments. Yet in eras
like the one following 1996, when programs are reeling under ideological
attack, this reflexive institutional caution should be most welcome.
Savvy administrators understand, however, that some change is
inevitable and even desirable. Thus, successful advocacy depends on
convincing administrators that a proposed new policy will require relatively
few resources to implement, that once implemented it can legally and
politically be left in place with minimal adjustments for years to come, that
it will bring concrete benefits to the agency (as opposed to the claimants the
agency serves), that the state will have enough time to implement it, and,
if possible, that some change in the given area is likely to be inevitable.
Self-declaration of income and passive redeterminations in Medicaid, as
well as quarterly and semiannual reporting in food stamps, were
successfully sold to states because they offered concrete benefits to the
agencies: less staff time spent determining eligibility and, in the case of
food stamps, fewer errors. The Medicaid changes also looked relatively
sustainable since the trend was for CMS to exercise progressively less
control over the states. States avoided implementing an option to provide
transitional food stamps that the Clinton Administration created in its
closing days while the Bush Administration's willingness to sustain it
remained in doubt, and continued to keep their distance when Congress
began considering legislation that could change the requirements on
implementing states.21 4 The USDA likely blunted states' resentment of the
new mandate to liberalize access to food stamps by giving them over six
months to implement it.
2 15
212. See id. § 273.12(f)(4)(viii).
213. The leading association of state welfare administrators, the American Public Human
Services Association, recommended creating a transitional food stamp option for the states. See
AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS'N, CROSSROADS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL POLICY 41 (2001),
http://www.aphsa.org/reauthor/crossroads.pdf.
214. See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: STATE
OPTIONS REPORT 4 (2003).
215. See Food Stamp Program: Noncitizen Eligibility and Certification Provisions, 65 Fed.
Reg. 70,134, 70,134 (Nov. 21, 2000); see also Solis v. Saenz, 60 Fed. Appx. 117 (9th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished opinion) (rejecting a challenge to the USDA's authority to give states this
discretion).
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Finally, state administrators tend to be strikingly responsive to clearly
articulated goals and concepts even when they are not backed with
enforcement mechanisms. This tendency results in part from
administrators' aversion to criticism. In addition, seasoned administrators
have learned that policies that start out as trends or preferences often mutate
into mandates on relatively short notice. If administrators believe that
adopting a policy is inevitable, they may prefer to get started with the task
rather than risk being given insufficient time once a mandate appears. More
generally, training eligibility workers to exercise open-ended discretion,
much less programming computers to account for such discretion, is far
more difficult than giving an agency a clear direction in which it is
expected to move. As important as the specific policies CMS and the
USDA adopted may have been, arguably even more important were their
signals that access was now a major priority. Even though the pace of food
stamp reform has slowed considerably under the Bush Administration, its
ratification of the Clinton Administration's major rulemakings 216 and
continuation of access reviews sent a message to states that access remained
a federal priority. By contrast, apart from any specific policy changes,
states' expressions of anxiety over Medicaid costs likely are affecting the
way eligibility workers treat Medicaid claimants.
3. The Value of Incentive-Based Public Benefits Advocacy
One objection to the approach to legal advocacy described in the
immediately preceding pages is that, even when it works, the resulting
policies often exist in relatively ethereal form. Superficially, the Bush
Administration could have wiped away the vast majority of these
initiatives, some by issuing simple guidance, others by freezing
rulemakings that had not taken effect when it came to office, and others by
going through simple new informal rulemaking proceedings to repeal those
rules already in effect. Had the Medicaid and food stamp agendas pursued
during the last four years of the Clinton Administration been, or been
perceived as being, simple benefit maximization for claimants, it might well
have done so. Indeed, a visionless agenda seeking only to increase benefits
willy-nilly for claimants might well have aroused such cynicism among
career officials in CMS, the USDA, and OMB that they might have taken
the initiative in starting that rollback as soon as the new administration
arrived. Yet with only two significant exceptions, that did not happen. In
both of the exceptions-some relatively technical changes in SCHIP
regulations and some much larger changes in a Medicaid managed care
rule-states were in vehement opposition and the Clinton initiatives did not
216. See Super, supra note 64 (manuscript at 53, 57).
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appear central to the visions of reducing uninsuredness and helping low-
wage workers.
Whatever stability these programs and particular policies will prove to
have comes in large part from the interplay between their strategic vision
and the technical details of the changes made. The broad appeal of the
vision makes the specific initiatives defensible even though most are too
technical to explain readily to the public. The impact of the particular
initiatives, in turn, lends credibility to the strategic vision and avoids the
cynicism that can prove lethal to public programs undertaken in the name of
idealism.
To dismantle the Medicaid and food stamp initiatives of its
predecessors credibly, the Bush Administration would need to do much
more than cancel particular policies. It also would have to articulate an
alternative vision that could compete with what they had implemented and
offer enough new specific policies to make itself look serious about that
alternative vision. For a busy administration with an extensive agenda, that
prospect apparently had little appeal. Indeed, the vision of supporting the
working poor won significant adherents among Bush political appointees,
particularly, although not exclusively, 21 7 within the USDA. Because they
are compatible with the contemporary political environment, these policies
are likely to survive unless and until that environment significantly
changes. No judgment in nonconstitutional litigation today can plausibly
claim any greater assurances of durability.
Nor does the diminished importance of the traditional attorney-client
relationship in shaping public benefits advocacy necessarily portend the
derogation of claimants' ability to articulate their own interests or a return
to a world in which only paternalistic visions, be they liberal or
conservative, shaped public benefit programs. First, the primacy of the
attorney-client relationship was not as empowering as it might have seemed
given the vast discretion attorneys had in allocating the scarce supply of
free representation. Although an attorney may be faithfully pursuing the
expressed wishes of his client, he may have preordained the course of the
representation when he decided which claimants he would represent in class
litigation or in a legislative or rulemaking process.
More importantly, advocacy in the post-PRWORA era generally takes
place in forums that are more accessible to claimants and their
organizations. Little of the important work in transforming Medicaid and
the food stamp program required a bar card. Development of an effective
advocacy strategy requires a nuanced feel for the legal constraints on
217. See, e.g., HAsKiNs, supra note 84, at 37-44 (arguing for the importance of Medicaid and
food stamps as supports for low-wage workers). Haskins subsequently became a high-level White
House advisor on welfare policy.
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agencies' discretion, strong lawyers, and a sensitive understanding of the
implicit limits on that discretion that the political process imposes. But it
also requires a sophisticated appreciation of the way local human services
offices operate and the kinds of obstacles that they place in the way of
claimants, intentionally or otherwise. Claimants have natural, hard-won
expertise in this latter field that can make them invaluable coalition partners
for attorneys and other advocates of human services programs.
Building effective coalitions between lawyers, other professionals, and
claimants, to be sure, will require more trust and open communication than
sometimes has been present between claimants and lawyers. Lawyers are
likely to resist investing great resources in an agenda that is patently beyond
what is legally or politically sustainable. Claimants, in turn, are unlikely to
see much point in pursuing proposals that they know are certain to be
mangled in implementation. Similarly, just as lawyers wishing to become
effective in the new environment must move beyond litigation and
traditional deterministic legal analysis, so too claimants and their
organizations are likely to need to diversify their advocacy arsenals beyond,
while not completely abandoning, traditional confrontational tactics of
demonstrations and sit-ins.
Saul Alinsky urged organizers "[w]herever possible go outside of the
experience of the enemy. Here you want to cause confusion, fear, and
retreat. ' '218 When fighting program administrators in court, before higher
executive or legislative authorities, or in the media, that remains sound
advice. In the current environment, however, advocates often must be
resourceful in framing their agendas within the experience of federal and
state administrators. Those officials frequently are cast as adjudicators on
proposals that no other policymakers are likely to address. More broadly,
their allegiances are increasingly critical in deciding battles between those
who would dismantle means-tested public benefit programs and those who
see those programs as having a vital role to play. PRWORA provides a
stark example of how much those programs can be damaged when state
administrators have been so thoroughly alienated that they are willing to
help legitimize the attacks of the programs' ideological opponents. The
transformation of Medicaid and the food stamp program in the years since
PRWORA, on the other hand, provides a hopeful demonstration that the
programs can regain state administrators' loyalties. Indeed, not only did that
reconciliation not come at a high cost to claimants, but many of the policies
that were most important to states also helped claimants.
Finding ways to seduce federal and state administrators to supporting
policies that will strengthen programs and improve their ability to serve
218. SAUL D. AL1NSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC
RADICALS 127 (1971).
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low-income people is a complex process, far more so than filing a simple
lawsuit or writing a legislative point paper. The skills required to engage in
this form of advocacy include but go far beyond those in which lawyers
traditionally are trained. The results are difficult to predict and, even when
favorable, generally lack the satisfying sense of progress that comes from a
court's judgment or an enacted statute. But with the stakes as high as they
are, those concerned about the well-being of low-income people can ill
afford to eschew these forums.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1949, Senator Robert A. Taft, one of the leading conservative
Republicans of his generation, declared:
I believe that the American people feel that with the high
production of which we are now capable, there is enough left over
to prevent extreme hardship and maintain a minimum standard
floor under subsistence, education, medical care and housing, to
give to all a minimum standard of decent living and to all children a
fair opportunity to get a start in life.2 19
Although the 1996 welfare law reflected a widespread rejection of the
method by which that aid was being provided, Senator Taft's sentiments
appear still to be widely shared by the American public. 220 Honoring those
charitable impulses while fulfilling promises of sharp reductions in welfare
caseloads presented state and local policymakers with a serious dilemma
that the traditional rule-based systems for rationing benefits could not
answer. Choice-based rationing strategies offered a way to resolve this
challenge that fit comfortably within contemporary market-oriented
ideology.
The time when the generosity and antipoverty effectiveness of public
benefit programs could be understood by considering those programs'
formal rules is past. Substantial numbers of low-income people long have
foregone benefits for which they were legally eligible, but state and local
officials' increasingly varied and energetic efforts to influence those
choices of claimants, or to induce procedural defaults that can be taken as
proxies for choices, have reduced the importance of eligibility policy
219. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 256 (1968).
220. Even conservative critics of means-tested benefits seem to concede this point. See
Hearing, supra note 85. The consistent choice of the conservative 104th Congress to avoid
extracting significant savings from AFDC when converting its funding to a block grant, and
PRWORA's sponsors' propensity to assert that the government would continue to help
low-income people avoid destitution, see, e.g., supra note 2, suggest that they, too, believe that
Senator Taft's benevolent sentiments continue to hold wide sway.
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significantly. The longer scholarly and public attention remains single-
mindedly fixated on formal rationing methods, the more informal rationing
methods will become entrenched without undergoing serious examination.
Although expanding claimants' choices can offer greater autonomy and
independence, the growth of informal rationing also creates the risks of
false or coerced choices and of illicit rationing agendas that could not have
won acceptance as the basis for substantive eligibility rules. Identifying and
quantifying the effects of practices that influence claimants' choices
concerning public benefit programs requires new analytical tools and far
more effort than appraising programs' eligibility rules. The time clearly has
passed when much could be accomplished with a simple appeal against
bureaucratic denials of benefits to eligible claimants.221
The costs of failing to rise to this challenge, however, are high. Choice-
based rationing policies often are designed so carelessly that, far from
improving the rationality with which benefits are distributed, they
disadvantage some of those most in need of assistance. The regressivity of
some informal rationing devices may exceed some of the most insensitive
changes in formal eligibility rules. Their shadowy nature subverts public
accountability both as to the goals of these programs and as to their
effectiveness in meeting those goals. Appeals to public opinion to increase
the generosity of assistance offered to low-income people will have great
difficulty succeeding as long as the public believes that its existing
programs are as generous as their eligibility rules would suggest.
On the other hand, the advantages this regime has over its historical
predecessors should not be neglected. Despite the 1996 welfare law, it
espouses a far stronger commitment to meeting need and preventing
hardship than guided programs of the past. One of its great shortcomings is
the vast discretion that local officials and individual eligibility workers have
to exacerbate or moderate the deterrents to receipt of benefits: That
authority can be wielded in a racially discriminatory manner or to subjugate
claimants to the whims of agencies' staffs. It seems unlikely, however, that
the extent of racism or paternalism that arises under this regime can match
that suffered by low-income claimants in the poorhouse period or the first
three decades of the AFDC program. Indeed, even during the legalistic era,
a determinedly bigoted or arrogant eligibility worker had considerable
opportunities to make the public benefits system more burdensome and
repellent with little practical risk of being called to account.
221. See, e.g., Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-435, §§ 201-220, 102 Stat.
1645, 1655-60 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 42 U.S.C.) (seeking explicitly
to remove barriers to access to the food stamp program); Dehavenon, supra note 102, at 250-54
(insisting that welfare programs' eligibility processes should be improved "[u]nless our society is
one consumed by hostility toward the poor").
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Although the personal choice regime in the aggregate is certainly
less generous philosophically and practically than its immediate
predecessor, the ideology of choice provides the basis for correcting some
central, highly counterproductive eligibility restrictions that had proven
immune to attack during the legalistic period. Moreover, in some respects
the new regime may be more susceptible to positive change than its
predecessor. Limiting or ending policies that degrade the value of benefits
will allow more to be done for low-income families without requiring any
expansion of public resources, an important opportunity at a time of
economic stagnation and shaky public finances. Indeed, since so much of
the constraint on the availability of benefits results from administrative
actions, programs can be liberalized much more without going through the
legislative process than was typically true under the legalistic regime. The
difficulty of extracting new money for program expansion or rationalization
proved a major shortcoming of the prior system.
Expanding low-income people's choices in relation to public benefit
programs is a laudable goal. Scholars and advocates should not seek to
eliminate choice-based systems as a class. They should, however, make
these systems more transparent to claimants and the general public, and
should do so while also seeking to identify and expose both those programs
that waste the resources of agencies and claimants alike and those that
disproportionately burden the most vulnerable claimants. Some of this quest
requires new empirical work, but a great deal can be accomplished
by applying rigorous analysis to the results of little-noticed studies already
in the public domain. 222 With careful analysis of these systems' effects
on claimants, choice-based programs may come to contribute to a humane
public welfare policy rather than subvert it, as such policies too often
do today.
222. See, e.g., VIVIAN GABOR & CHRISTOPHER BOTSKO, CHANGES IN CLIENT SERVICE IN
THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM AFTER WELFARE REFORM: A SYNTHESIS OF CASE STUDIES IN
EIGHT STATES 18-19 (Office of Analysis, Nutrition & Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Food
Stamp Program Report No. FSP-01-CSCFP, 2001), http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/
Published/FSP/FILES/ProgramOperations/ClientServices.pdf (describing numerous practices that
impede access to food stamps and likely violate the right to apply for food stamps, as set out in
7 C.F.R. § 273.2(c)(2), and the limitations on the verification process, prescribed in 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.2(d)(1), (f(4)-(5)).
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